52 FEDERAL Rmronrmn
ness as to the matter charged. It is also a general rule that
in an indictment for an offence created by statute it is suffi-
cient to describe the offence in the words of the statute.
In the case of the U. S. v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, the
supreme court had occasion to point out the precise scope and
limitations of this rule, and after stating the rule Justice
Harlan says, in the opinion: "But to this general rule there
is the qualification, fundamental in the law of criminal pro-
cedure, that the accused must be apprised by the indict-
ment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusa-
tion against him, to the end that he may prepare his defence,
and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offence." And here, I think, we strike the
fatal point in this indictment; for, after as careful and seri-
ous consideration as a case of this nature requires, I am
unable to see how defendant could plead his present conviction
under this indictment, and a judgment thereon, in bar of a
second prosecution for the same offence. It is alleged, only,
that he presented to the pension agent a claim for pension
moneys under a pension certificate which was procured by
false and fraudulent proofs, and unlawful and fraudulent
devices. The fraud should have been, by apt allegation,
more particularly identified; it should have been alleged
what the proofs and devices were, and wherein they were
fraudulent; and it is, in my judgment, immaterial when the
proofs were made, or devices resorted tO-—WllGl]l1€I‘ at the
time of presenting the claim, or at a time anterior-—and
when made, as the basis for obtaining the pension certificate.
If the fradulent devices had consisted of an act done when
payment was demanded, it would, I think, be clear that the
nature of the devices, or particular fraud practiced at the
— time, should be alleged, and, if this is so, it seems also
essential that they should be alleged, though they were, in
fact, practiced at and before the time of obtaining the pension
certificate. The offence, it is true, was one committed, not
U in 1867, but in 1877 and in 1878-—that is, a claim was pre-
sented for payment at those tiin1es—but, going back to the
origin of the alleged fraud, l do not understand why it is not