w11.oox v. rrvm HUNDRED TON  or cou.. 51
by the supreme court. The language of the libel is "that by reason
of the premises the libelants acquired a lien on said cargo for the
freight thereon, as set forth ab0ve," which amounted in the whole to
the sum of $1,375. This was the amount due for freight, on the
assumption that $2.75 per ton was to be paid, claiming the whole
amount as contained in the bill of lading. ~
The answer of the claimants to this allegation of the libelant is that, _ I p
in regard to the matter stated in the fifth article of the libel on infor-
mation and belief, they deem the same to be true; and it is claimed on
the part of libelant that there is an admission in the answer that the
libelant had a lien. V But I think this is not a true construction of the
language of the answer. It is entirely inconsistent with other claims
set forth in the answer, and it could not have been the meaning of
the defendants in the court below, and they could not have intended
to admit that the libelant had a lieu on the cargo for the whole `
amount of the stipulated freight. I take it, therefore, all they in-
tended to admit was that. if the freight had been brought to Chicago
in the fall of 1872, then the vessel would have had a lien for the ,
freight stipulated in the bill of lading. This question of pleading
being decided adversely to the libelant, is there any other proof
which will bring the case within the rule as stated by the supreme
court of the United States? I think there is not. Certainly, there _ \
was no understanding on the part of the consignees that the lien was
retained by the libelant; there is no proof whatever of any statement
made or claim insisted on at the time the property was delivered to the t
consignees. There is no settled usage of the port of Chicago shown
upon the subject of these liens where the property is delivered to the
consignee. So on that account I think the lien must fail. But, inde-
pendent of that, it may be a question whether the fair construction of
. the contract between the parties was not that the price was to be paid ·
on the assumption that the property was delivered in Chicago that
fall. There is no evidence whatever upon this point, and the court
y is left to infer what the intention of the parties was at the time the
coal was delivered on the vessel in the early part of November, 1872.
T_he price was a very high price,—confessed.y so; and perhaps the
natural inference to be drawn from all the circumstances of the case is r
that the price was agreed to be paid on the understanding that the .
coal was to be delivered in Chicago that fall; and if that is so, the ~
libelant is not entitled to the full amount of the price named inthe -
bill of lading,·beca~use that would be an essential element entering
into the contract. It was so early in the fall that the expectation by