4; A FEDERAL 1m1>o1zrEB..
removal is soughtunder the act of 1875. Kaelser v. Ill. Cent. R.
R. 2 Mc(Jrary, 187; [S. C. 6 FED. REP. 1.]
It is further settled that when a party to a suit pending in the
United States court dies, and his administrator or executor is sub-,
stituted for the decedent, the suit does not abate, but the cause con-
tinues; and that the jurisdiction of the federal court,,having attached
during the life-time of the decedent, is not terminatedoraiiected by
· the substitution of an administrator or executor who is a citizen of
the state whereof the other litigants are citizens. Clark v. Mathew-
s0n, 412 Pet. 164; Morgan v. Morga/n., 2 Wheat. 290; Clark v. Dunn,
8 Pet; 1. lWhen, however, suits are instituted by or against admin-
istrators orexecutors in the hrst instance, then jurisdiction and the
right of removal is dependent upon the citizenship of the person act-
` ing as administrator or executor, and not upon the citizenship of the
. ‘ decedent, creditors, legatees, or other beneficiaries. Riel v. Houston,
13 Wall. 66; Amory v. Amory, 95 U. S. 186. None of these authori-
V ties, however, exactly touch the question nowbefore the court. As-
suming that Grace H. Litchheld had the right of removal, she did not
exercise it during her life-time. The jurisdiction of the United
States court, therefore, did not attach to the case during her life-
time. Did the right of removal possessed by her, at the instant of
her death pass to her administrator?. If the right of: removal existed
. whentho suit was commenced, couldsuch right be terminated by a
change of residence on part of Mrs. Litchfield or on part of her
administrator ? 1 ‘ A c
In the case of Roh'}; v. Randle, 103 U. S. 222, a case was removed
from the state court by a trustee of an insolvent insurance com-»
pany, who was substituted in the cause as the representative of an
‘ insolvent and virtually extinct corporation, and it would seem as
though the court placed the right of removal upon the citizenship of
the trustee, who was substituted in the cause after its commence-
ment; but it is not made clear beyond question that such was the
view of the supreme court. If it be true that the supreme court did
place the right of removal upon the fact that the trustee was a citi-
zen of Missouri, then it would seem to follow that if he had been a
citizen of Louisiana he could not have removed the cause, even though
the corporation which he represented had been a citizen of Missouri,
and hence could have removed the cause. This would, in principle,
be decisive of the question now before the court, but the facts of that
case show that the insolvent corporation was a citizen of Missouri;