eoomvow v. causes. 5 _
and in the opinion this fact is stated as though it might have weight
upon the question, and hence it is not clear that the supreme court `V
rested the right of removal upon the sole fact of the citizenship of
the trustee. i `
On principle, the question, in myjudgment, resolves itself into the
proposition whether Mrs. Litchfield could, after the cause had been
commenced, have removed to and become a citizen of Iowa, and still
retained the right of removal under the local-prejudice act.' That
act gave the right of removal to the party who was a non-resident of
the state wherein the suit was pending, and seems to proceed upon ,
the theory that, by reason of such non-residency, a prejudice or local
influence may exist against the non-resident, which will prevent the
non-resident from obtaining justice in the local court. If, then, a
non-resident, after being sued in the state court, before trial removes
to and becomes a citizen of the state wherein the litigation, is pend- j
~ ing, has not the fundamental reason, upon which removals are per-
mitted under this act, ceased to exist, and does it not follow that the .
right of removal has ceased to exist? In my judgment, the party
' asking a removal under the act of 1867 must be ` a non-resident
when the petition for removal is filed; and hence, if Mrs. Litchfield
during her life-time had removed to Iowa, such change of citizenship
would have defeated or terminated the right of removal. If the ju-
risdiction of the United States court had attached, and then she had
removed to Iowa, such change of citizenship would not have affected
the jurisdiction that had already attached. · *
If then, Mrs. Litchfield, by removingto Iowa, would have termi-
nated the right of removal, should not the same result follow if the
party whois substituted for her, and succeeds to her rights, is a’citi-
zen of Iowa? Viewing the question in the light of the position taken V `
by counsel for the administrator,-i. e., that the administrator suc-
ceeds to, and stands exactly in the place of, the decedent,—it still
seems to me that when the adyninistrator asks to remove the cause,
the court must consider the question in the light of the facts as they
now exist, and that in this view, as already stated, it must be held _
that the party to the suit had removed from New York to Iowa, and‘~
that it makes no difference whether such removal took place during
the life-time of Mrs. Litchfield, or after her death, by substituting in _
her place a citizen of Iowa. The fact in either case would be the .
' i ame, to-wit, that the application for removal is made by one who
he a citizen of Iowa, and, being such, a removal cannot be had at his `
instance under the act of 1867, as the right, under that act, is re-