12 _ _ rnnnnln nmromnn. q
Among the meanings of the word “tax" are "a requisition; a de-
mand; a burden," (W0rcest.;) and it is here used in the sense of a
charge or burden, for which the state may make a requisition in the
p1·escribed mode. _
It is obvious, therefore, that what is said by the supreme court in
Ilnine v. Levee C'om’·rs, 19 Wall. 655, that "taxes not assessed are
not liens, and that the obligation to assess taxes is not a lien on the
property on which they ought to be assessed," has no application to
the case at bar. The taxes there spoken of are taxes, inthe legal ac— ·
ceptation of the word, levied on theproperty of all the citizens alike
to support the government or discharge a common burden.
It is. argued that the right to taxqor charge the “railroad company,"
and sequester its "income and revenues,", did not give an equitable
lien on the road itself for the income and revenues derivedthere-
from. The company was createdsto build and operate a railroad.
Under its charter it could lawfully conduct no other business. From
what source,_then, was it expected to derive its income and revenues ?
Obviously from the operation of its road. How could the state se- i
quester the income and revenues of the company without sequester-
ing the income and revenues derived from the operation of its road;
and how could the income revenues derived from that source be seques-
tered unless the state or her_ representatives had possession of the
road? ,,, . I , . . .
, V In Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306, tl1e supreme_ court quotes
approving1y what was said by the chancellor iu Legard v.vHod_qes:
"I ta_ke..the,doctrine to be true that when parties come to an agree-
V ment as_to,the producepof `1ands,,ith,e·lapd itself. will be affected by
the agreement." Takingell the provisions of these acts into view,
the implication is irresistible that it was the intention of the parties
to {ix a charge or lien on the railroad, or its earnings, or both, for
the whole debt. , This intention, seems tooobvious for serious ques-
1 ' tion, and the court will giye effect tothat intention. Q ~ I `  
· . In Ketchum v, St. Louis, Aszqmagthe court approved the language
usedein another Englishcase, where Lord Justice Tunmcn said;
,·• There can, _1 think, be no doubt that itwas intended by these agreem ents
to create a charge upon the property 0fVth_e,c01npvauy;_ but it is said on thepart;
of the omcial liquidator that this intention_4was not well carried into effect. 1 _
apprehend, however, that where`this“c0’i1rt is satisfied that it was intended to
create a` charge, and that the parties who, intended to create ithad the power
to do so, it will give effect to the intention, notwithstanding`. any mistake
which may have occurred inthe attempt to eiTect.·it.’f ~ v   ~