24 rmmum. nmronrm.
‘ pany is void also, and must fall. We do not so understand the law.
Undoubtedly a constitutional part of a statute may be so connected
with that which is unconstitutional as to make it impossible, if the
unconstitutional part is stricken out, to give effect to what, taking the
r whole together, appears to have been the legislative will. In such a
case the whole statuteis void; but in this, as in every other statutory
construction, all depends upon the intention of the legislature, as
shown by the general scope of the law. To our minds it is clear, in
the present case, that the object of the legislature was not to create
a debt which the state was expectedto pay, but to aid the company
in borrowingmoney. upon the credit ofthe state., As between the
state and the company the debt for the money borrowed was to be the
. debt of thecompany. If the state paid its bonds from its own funds,
the mortgage could be enforcedto compel the company to make the
state good for all such payments. If the state did not pay, then
A the creditors had their own recourse upon the mortgage. The state
credit, soifar as the state and thecompany were concerned, was only
toaid the company in borrowing money on its own bonds. In any
event, the company was to be bound for the payment of the entire
e debt·when··it matured, and its property was to be given as security.
Under these circumstances, it seems to us that the unconstitutional
part of the statute may be stricken out, and the obligation of the com-
pany, including its statutory mortgage in favor of the state bond-
holders, left in full force. The striking out is not necessarily by
erasing words, but it may be by disregarding the unconstitutional
provision, and reading the statute as if that provision was not there.
These bonds, as state obligations, were void, but as against the com-
pany, which had actually put them out, they were good." This judg-
mentof the supreme court, in a case on all fours with the case at bar,
concludes the question. And see Johnson v. Griswold, 2 Mo. Ct.
App. 150.
A single question remains. The act of 1869 was 1·epealed by the
act of May 29, 1874. Thisrepeal does not affect the rights of the
parties to this suit. All contracts made under the act, or of which it
constituted a part, and the rights acquired by such contracts, are un-
affected by the repeal. The obligations of the railroad company to
the holders of the state bonds, and the rights acquired by the latter,
whatever theymay have been, under and by virtue of that act, re-
main to be enforced the same as if no repeal had taken place. lf
this were otherwise, the actof 1868 would still remain, which con-
tains all the essential provisions embraced in the act of 1869.