rmvmn v. rmnou. 29
to derive title; that the legal operation of the partition was to effect
an exchange of distinct parcels of land between the heirs of Lowns-
dale and the children of Nancy; and that the former took as pur- V
chasers from said children and not by descent from their ancestor,
and therefore the statute of limitations had not run on October 17,
1878. ~ t ~
At most, the heirs of Lownsdale could only have received three-
nfths of block 254- from the children of Nancy by this exchange, for V
that was all they ever had in it. But I am still satisfied with the
ruling upon this point in Fields4v. Squires, 1 Deady, 391. In that
case I held that thispartition divided the land between fthe children
of Nancy on the one hand and the heirs and vendees of Lownsdale
on the other, according to the respective interests of the latter, with-
· out attempting to determine what they were, giving to the children-
in land and owelty what was deemed the equivalent of three·fifths ol
the premises, and to the heirs and vendees in land charged with the
payment of this owelty what was deemed equivalent to two·fifths of
the same. Tothe same effect see Davenport v. Lamb, 13 Wall. 428.
The portions or parcels then ascertained -and set. apart in severalty
to the children of Nancy were in contemplation of law the very three-
Hfths which they took from the United States under the donation act
after the death of their mother,.and inlike contemplation the remain-
ing two-nfths were the very portion of the premises which the heirs l
of Lownsdale inherited from him, subject, .however,,to the legal effect
of the acts done and suffered by him concerning the same, Nor was
the character or origin of the estate or title of these parties changed
or affected by this decree and partition. The heirs of Lownsdale
took the two-fifth tract by descent from him, as his heirs; and as such
were and are so far bound by his acts and conduct relating to the
same, as he would be himself; if living. This was not an exchange
of distinct parcels of land owned in entirety by either party, but a
separation of undivided interests in a tract theretofore- owned by
them in common. ` I ‘
The plaintiffs also contend that their right to the possession, and
to maintain this suit for partition, did not accrue until the half of
the donation inuring to the wife was finally designated in and by ~
the patent issued on June 6, 1865-a little over 14 years before the
commencement of these suits. ' On the contrary, the defendants in-
sist that the right of possession accrued to the plaintiffs, or those .
under whom they claim, on April 8, 1852, when Lownsdale made
the proof, under section 7 of the donatiorract, of the commencement ·