IRELAND v. dEBAGHTY• 4:5
There can be no doubt of the proposition that a delivery of a deed is as
necessary to the passing of the estate as the signing, and that so long as the
grantor retains the legal control of the instrument, the title cannot pass any
more than if he had not signed the deed. Shep. Touch. 57; 3 Washb. Real
Prop. *577; Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460, 476; Johnson v. Farley, 45 N. H.
505; Overman v. Kerr, 17 Iowa, 490; Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 421; Duer v.
James, 42 Md. 492; Youngs v. Guilbsau, 3 Wall. 641. Thus, where a deed was
placed in the hands of a depositary, to be delivered to the grantee upon the
death of the grantor, provided it was not previously recalled, but the grantor
reserved the right and power to recall it at any time, this was held not to be
a good delivery. Cook v. Brown, supra; Stinson v. Anderson, 96 Ill.`373!
Prestman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644; Baker v. Haskell, 47 N. H. 479; Brown v.
Brown, 66 Me. 316.
To constitute delivery of a deed the grantor must, as a rule, part with the
possession of it, or, at least. with the right to retain possession. Youngs v.
Guilbsau, supra; Johnson v. Farley, supra. Even the registry of the deed by
the grantor, though entitled to great consideration `upon this point, and sufii- _
cient, perhaps, in the absence of opposing evidence, to justify a presumption »
of delivery, is not conclusive, and the presumption may be repelled bythe
attendant and subsequent circumstances. Youngs v. Guilbeau, supra ; M itch
ell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377. See, also, Masterton v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 72. _
‘ Although, as a rule, the grantor parts with the possession of the deed, a
formal delivery to the grantee in person is not necessary. A delivery may be
by acts without words, or by words without acts, or by both. Anything `
which clearly manifests the intention of the grantor, and the person to whom
it is delivered, that the deed shall presently becomeoperative and effectual;
that the grantor loses all control over it; and that by it the grantee is to be-
come possessed of the estate,-constitutes a suliicient delivery. The very
essence of the delivery is the intention of the party, (Bryan v. Wash, 2'Gilm,
557, 565; "Walker v. Walker, 42 Ill. 311; Masterton v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 72; Duer
v. James, 42 Md. 492; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 259; Nichol v.
Davidson Oo. 3 Tenn. Gb. 547; Thatcher v. St. Andrew’s Church, 37 Mich. 264;
Gregory v. Walker, 38 Ala. 26; Dearmond v. Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191; Sorners
v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231 , Burkolder v. Casad, 47 Ind. 418; Rogers v. Cary,
47 Mo. 235; Shep. Touch. 57, 58;) and the intent of either or both the parties
may be implied from subsequent admissions, conduct, or circumstances;
Nichol v. Davidson Co., supra. Where the circumstances show, unmis-
itakably, that one party intended tc divest himself of title,? and to invest the
other with it, delivery will be complete, though the instrument still remains
in the hands of the grantor. Ruekman v. Ruckman, supra. Thus, where a
father voluntarily made a deed to hisson and did not deliver it, but their sub-
sequent conduct was such as toshow that both of them considered., the deed
as having been effectually executed forlthe purpose of passing tit1e,,itwas r
iheld that no actual delivery was necessary. t Walker v._ Walker, supra.  
The law presumes much more iu favor of the delivery of deeds in cases ot
¢voluntary settlements, espeoiallyiwhen made to infants; thanvit does infordi-
`nary. eases of bargain and suis.-, The same degreeiofformality is never required,
on account of the great degree of confidence which the parties are presumed