c §'EDEll.AL REPORTER.
to have in each other, and the inability of the grantee, frequently, to take care
of his own interests. The presumption of law is, in such cases, said to be in
favor of the delivery, and the burden of proof is on the grantor to show clearly
that there was none. Bryan v. Wash, supra. See, also, Walker v. Walker,
supra. It is a general rule that acceptance by the grantee is necessary to
constitute a good delivery. But where a grant is plainly beneficial to the
grantee, his acceptance of it will, it is said, be presumed, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Rogers v. Cary, 47
Mo. 235; Dikes v. Miller, 24 Tex. 417; Dale v. Lincoln, 62 Ill. 22. See, how-
ever, Com. v. Jackson,) 10 Bush, 424. An infant of any age can be the
grantee of land. Masterton v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 72; A Ricard v. Walker, 39
Ill. 413. And, in such case, an actual delivery being useless and an acceptance
, impossible in many cases, the intention of the grantor is the controlling ele-
ment, the acceptance of the grantee of a beneficial conveyance being presumed:
i _Ma.s·terton v. Cheek, supra; Ricard v. Walker, 39 Ill. 413; Cecil v. Beaver,
28 Iowa, 241; Spencer v. Carr. 45 N. Y. 410. In such case it is said that a
greater presumption of acceptance is indulged in their behalf than as to
_ adults fromthe fact of their incapacity to manifest directly their acceptance
of the deed. Ricard v. Walker, 39 Ill. 413.
An attentive consideration of the above cases will, it is believed, lead the
reader to theconclusion that the decision of the learned judge, in the principal
case upon the point in question, is entirely correct. Actual delivery being ,
useless, and the conveyance clearly beneficial to the infant, in the absence of
- evidence showing a contrary intention on the part of the grantor the court,
would have been warranted in finding that the title passed by the deed. But
tne circumstances, as it seems to the writer, show that such was not the
intention of the grantor, which, according to the authorities above cited, con-
stitutes the controlling element in the case. Indeed, the retention of control
of the deed, and his subsequent dealings with the same property, seem clearly
`inconsistent with an intention on his part that the conveyance in question
should opera.te_to pass the title. Upon the whole, the whole case seems well
decided.   _ O , Msnsiranr. D. Ewntn.
Chicago, February 15, 1883. A
Onnnrr Comms_ (Limited), or Lonnou, Enenmn, v. Amnmsss Cam.
. B. Co. and others. ,
(Uireuit Uourf, E'. D. Arkansas. October Term, 1882.)
. 1. RAHJR0ADS—RECEWER—CERTIFICLTEB or- Im>nn·rnnNnss—RnrAm or Roan.
I A court of equity may authorize the receiver of at railroad to issue certificates
of indebtedness audmnke them a.` first lien upon the road, for the purpose of
‘· raising funds to make necessary repairs and improvements, but it is a power to
,. be sparingly exercised; and when the road cannot be kept running without its
A exercise, except to s very limited extent, the sound practice is to discharge the
· receiveror stop running the road and speed the foreclosure. y