omsnrr oo. ·v. ARKANSAS omwr. B. co. 53
the decree, and the plaintiff is estopped to do so by reason of having
filed and proved inthe master’s office more than one-third in amount
of all the bonds issued,·with full knowledge of all the facts. This
was a ratification of the action of the trustee. (4) If it be conceded
that the requisition of the holders of one-third in amount of the bonds
was indispensable to authorize a decree for the full sum of the mort-
gage debt, that fact would not affect the jurisdiction of the court or
the validity of its decree when collaterally attacked. The jurisdic-
tion of the court to pronounce a decree in the case is not contested, B
and if it rendered a decree for more than was due it was · error
merely, which might have been corrected on appeal by the proper
party in apt time. But if it be conceded that it was an error, it was
_ one of which the trustee could not complain; and there being no i
fraud on the part of the trustee the bondholders are as much bound
as the trustee, and cannot avoid the decree in any form of proceed-
ings. Shaw v. Railroad Co. supra. _ -
3 It is needless to discuss in detail the charges of fraud contained in ‘
the bill. The plaintiff has lost all right to be heard by its own gross
laches. In excuse for the long delay, the bill alleges the plaintiff was
ignorant of the facts until recently. This allegation is not true.
The plaintiffs agent had notice of all the facts, and testifies he com-
municated them to the plaintiff immediately after the sale. But the
bill itself does not state a case that will excuse the delay. "A gen-
eral allegation of ignorance at one time and knowledge at another is
of no effect. If the plaintiff made any particular discovery it should
be stated when it was made, what it was, how it was made, and why
it was not made sooner. * * * There must be reasonable dili-
gence, and the means of knowledge are the same,,then, in effect as
knowledge itself." Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 140; Har-
wood v. Railroad C0. 17 Wall. 78; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87.
' In Harwood v. Railroad .00. supra, there was a delay of 1'ive years, and
in Twin-lick Oil Oo. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, there was aydelay of
four years, and the. court denied relief in both cases on the ground of
laehes, In the case last cited, the defendant, at the time he pur-
chased the corporate property,`was a stockholder andrdirector in the i
company, and the bill, which sought to charge him as a trustee, was
filed by the company, and not, as in the case at bar, by abondholder. .
All parties in this case were authorized to bid at the sale, and the
fact that Johnson was president of the railroad company and the
plaintiff. a holder of bonds of the companydid not in itself raise a T ‘
trust relation between them which would entitle the lattersto charge -