Tm; DEBBIE msn. 29
indistinguishable, before the nuisance is committed, and the action
effecting the nuisance is joint. A
Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N. Y. 56, expressly recognizes the rule
that "an equitable action will lie to restrain parties who severally
contribute to a nuisance, while it holds that they cannot be joined in
an action at law." So does Crossley v. Ltghtowler, L. B. 3 Eq. 279,
and Duke of Buccleugh v. Cowan, 5 Gt. of Sess. Cas. (3d Series,) 214.
See White v. Jameson, L. B. 18 Eq. 303. Keyes v. Little York,
G. W. rc W. Co. 53 Cal. 7 24, it must be admitted, decides the ex- ,
act question now under consideration in favor of the defendants;
and I cannot overlook that case. With all proper deference to the
court rendering the decision, I am compelled to say that I think
the importance of the distinction between proceedings at law and
in equity with reference to the question involved, and the facility
with which a court of equity can adjust its decrees so as to meet
every requirement of justice, either did not attract due attention,
or was not duly appreciated. There is a very great difference be-
tween seeking to recover damages at law for an injury already in- = .
flicted by several parties, acting independently of each other, and
restraining parties from committing a nuisance, or from contribut· _
ing to create, or increase a nuisance in the future. In equity the
court is not tied downto one particular form of judgment. It can
adapt its decrees to the circumstances in each case, and give the
proper relief as against each party, without reference to the action
of others, and without injury to either. Each is dealt with with
respect only to °his own acts, either as affected or unaffected by
the acts of the others. It is not necessary, for the purpose of preven-
tion of future injury, to ascertain what particular share of the dam-
ages each defendant has inflicted in the past, or is about to inflict in
the future. It is enough to know that he has contributed, and is con- . i
tinuing to contribute, to a nuisance, without ascertaining to what ex-
tent, and to restrain him from contributing at all. But if otherwise,
I do not perceive why the proportion of the injury inflicted by each
may not be ascertained when practicable, and the decree adapted to
give a proper remedy as to each. The greater elasticity in the forms `
and modes of proceedings in equity enables the court to so mold its
decrees as to meet the special circumstances of each defendant, -and
thus do entire justice to many parties, under circumstances wherein
a judgment at law would be wholly inadequate-—circumstances which
would render it impracticable to unite them in one action in that
form of proceeding. And this is the foundation of the well—established