` me nscms cass. 33
multifariousness, but "every case must be governed by its own cir-
cumstanees," and the court must exercise a sound discretion on the
_ subject. Are not all these defendants "interested in the principal
matter in controversy?" Nay, in the only matter in controversy ? Are
not the law and the facts and the evidence to establish the control-
ling facts, and the relief demanded against each, identical as to all? ·
Then, why, under the injunction of the supreme court, should they
not all be united in one bill for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity A r
of suits ? In my judgment, if the bill does not present a case precisely
like any other found in the books, it, nevertheless, presents one within
the principles laid down, and one that a court of equity, in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion, is required to entertain—one that it can·
not rightfully or properly refuse to entertain. It violates none of the
limitations suggested in Gaines v. Chew. It will not subject the differ-
ent parties to "expense or inconvenience in litigating matters in which
they have no interest," but a “multiplicity of suits" is avoided by
joining the several defendants, all of whom are interested in the only
controversy in the action. The controlling facts are the same; the evi-
dence to establish them is identical; the right claimed and theques-
tions of law are one and the same; the same relief is asked against all;
they all contribute to the same nuisance complained of; and there _
can be no more inconvenience and little more expense in determining
all the rights of all the parties in one suit than would be required in
each suit in determining them in several independent suits. The
expense to each individual will be greatly diminished. While to re.
quire the complainant to pursue each defendant separately would be
to put upon him a burden so impracticable and onerous as to amount
to an absolute denial of justice. If each contributor to the nuisance `
must be sued separately, then there is no adequate remedy for such
an injury. The locality of the nuisance is the common point, like
the point of convergence in an hour-glass, upon which the previously
aggregated results of the originally independent acts of the several de-
fendants concentrate, and jointly operate, and from which the joint
effects again radiate and distribute themselves upon all within the
reach of their influence. _
I can perceive no sound reason in the established principles of
equity jurisprudence and practice why two or more of the parties in-
jured by the common nuisance should not be permitted to unite, and ,
two or more of those co-operating to commit it should not be joined
in one suit to redress the injury and enjoin a conbizzamnce or in-
v.16,n0.1—-3 A,