52 l FEDERAL rnmronrmn.
That a different rule should prevail in case of a settlement be-
tween debtor and creditor, where property wholly outside of the dif-
ferences between the parties is given in payment, is neither in accord-
ance with reason or the law, as I understand either. The defendant
urges strongly as applicable here the view of the law taken by Justice
BRADLEY in the case of Chapman v. Wilson, 5 FED. REP. 305, some time
, since decided inthis court. As Iunderstand that case it was en-
tirelydiiferent in its facts from this. Warranty was expressly waived
in regard to the thing given in payment; and the invalid thing, the
subject of contest, was a worthless collateral security. The case of
V Davis v. Lee, 20 La. Ann. 248, also cited, was a genuine case of
transaction and compromise. The svllabns shows how little it bears
on this case.
“ When several parties having interest in an estate enter into a transaction,
the object of which is to end litigation and settle all matters in dispute, none
of the parties are bound in warranty to the others on account of the interest
in real property therein conveyed."
The case of Wright v. Temple, 13 La. Ann. 413, appears to be a
parallel case to this, and there it was held that "a transfer of an
obligation of a third person in part payment or acquittance of a debt,
the amount of which is ascertained by a settlement, is "not a compro-
mise but a dation en paiemcnt.”i A ~
— The verdictof the jury is against the law, and I am constrained to
grant a new trial. In charging the jury I was particularly careful
to inform them that, in order to find for the defendant on the theory
of compromise or transaction, they must find from the evidence that
warranty of ownership must have been expressly waived or that the
title or ownership of the bonds was one of the differences compr0—
mised. The jury may not have understood this instruction; if they
did and followed it, then their verdict is wholly unsupported by the
evidence inithe case, and anew trial should be granted on that
grounds E i E · —
‘ In granting a new trial I do not want to be considered as holding
that in the transfer of the bonds inthis case there was anyother
warranty by Copes & Phelps than that of ownership or the right to
transfer. And this leadsme to say that perhaps the stipulated
price at which they werertaken in payment may not be the true rule
in damages in this cease; ·If theicollectibility of the bondswas not
warranted, it would seem more equitableto require from Copes &
Phelps the value they would have had ifgenuine; in other words,
what plaintiffs firm would have realized in the foreclosure of the