- 6 . rnnnnan nnromizn.
and solicitors fees somewhat in the manner which has always pre-
vailed in England. There certain items were taxable as attorney’e
fees, quite as a matte1· of course, and others were or were not taxable
according to the peculiarities of the case; the whole subject being
, largely regulated by statute, or the rules and practice of the courtl
The rule at law was to tax them in favor of the prevailing party as
a matter of right; but in-equity, while this was the general rule, the
court, in its discretion, governed by well-settled principles of judgment,
may refuse costs, tax them against the prevailing party, divide them,
enlarge the items of taxation, or otherwise regulate the allowance as
it may deem just. Trustees v. Grccnough, 105 U. S. 535; Lottery
Co. vs Clark, 16 Frm. Bsr. 20; U. S. v. Treadwell, 15 Fnn. Rm. 532;
Wicgaucl v. Copeland, 14 FED. Bur. 118. And it is important to
remember that, both at law and in equity, there were interlocutory
costs and final costs. Those that were interlocutory were such as were
“ allowed, taxable, and payable during the progress of the cause from
‘ time totime, as different stages were reached; and those that were
hnal were such as were not allowable, taxable, or payable until the
~ case had been finally determined. But in all cases the items were
· well ascertained, and usually were the subject of specific regulations
hxing small sums for particular services ofthe clerk, attorney, or
other officer of the court. Those that were yinal were not necessarily
for services performed in and about the ceremony of trial o1· "tinal
- hearing," but were for services performed from the very commence-
ment, all along through the case, and included all costs not strictly
taxable asintcrlocutory which were comparatively less, and were lim-
ited to those that strictly belonged to the interlocutory proceeding
itself. —- — ~ ..
It is not necessary to go into any more particular explanation of
this distinction between interlocutory and hnal costs, nor those often
obscure distinctions pertinent to the general subject, but not kept up
under our new system, which grow out of regulations for taxing costs
as between party and party simply, or between party and party as y
between solicitor and client, or the summary taxation statutes de-
signed to control the relation and the fees chargeable between the
- solicitor and the client, but having no necessary connection between
the. parties to the suit. V
But the practice on the subject of costs as it existed when our
judicial system was organized cannot be overlooked in construing
our legislation affecting the practice any more than we can ignore it
in other matters of more importance, particularly since the equity
rules specially refer us for analogies to the old practice in all its
departments. 2 Daniel], Ch. Pr. (5th Ed.) 1376,1378, note 1, 1379,
1395, note 6, 1398, note 4, 1410, note 4, 1434-1452; 2 Mad. Ch.
j 413-436; 1 Newl. Ch. 393-427; 2 New]. Ch. 390; Beames, Eq. Costs,
‘ (20 Law Library,) 4, S5, 159, 160, 184, 214-230, 2.56; 2 Bac. Abr.
it. "Costs," (Bouv. Ed.) 183; 2 Tidd, Pr. (3d Amer. Ed.) 945, 976;