ooonrmn v. sswyrza. 7·
2 ZIacob’s Fisher’s Dig. tit. "Gosts"; Weeks, Attys. 532; 20 Amer.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 5263. R _ y
` The fallacy of the argument made here against taxing the docket
fee for the solicitor consists in assuming that it is a kind of honora-
rium for the work gone through with in the ceremony of a trial at the
_ "final hearing," and there is an unnecessary conflict of suggestion as
to what amount of ceremony must be had to entitle the solicitor to
this fee. It is treated as a sum allowed for a specific thing done,
like, for example, the dollar allowed the clerk for issuing a writ. It
is not such an allowance at all. The system of allowing small sums
for specific work done is kept up as to the clerk, marshal, and com-
missioners, but that system as to the attorneys is abrogated, and
they are allowed a lump sum for all their fees in a case, except,
alone, the deposition fee, which, again, is a lump sum for each depo-
sition, irrespective of the work done on it. It is called a "doeket" fee,
andthe use of that word indicates that it is not allowed for the
work of going through a "final hearing," but for all the service in a
case. Too much stress has been put upon the use of the words
"final hearing," as a discrimination in the character of the cases in
which this docket fee is taxable and those in which it is not; and
there has been a misleading adherence to a supposed analogy of con-
struction found in the allowances prescribed for "cases at law" by
the same statute. ‘ ‘
Again, a too-isolated attention ispaid to this section 824 of the
Revised Statutes, in considering this docket fee, and too little atten-
tion to other parts of the same statute found at sections 823 and 983
. - of the Revision. Reading the whole statute together, as originally
passed, and as it is found in the Revision, in the light of previ-
ous legislation and the practice under that 'legislation, and the law
of costs at law, in equity, and in adrniralty, as shown by the above-
cited authorities, (as it must be read to understand it,) and it is
plain that these "docket fees" in civil cases, as well as the deposition
fees, are a lump sum substituted forthe small "fees" allowed attor-
neys and solicitors under the old system, chargeable to and collect-
ible from their clients, in addition ta “such reasonable compensation
° for their services" as they may charge and receive, (Bev. St. § 823;)
and that this lump sum is only taxable as costs against the losing
party "in eases u·/zero by law costs are recoverable in jhvor of the pre-
vailing part_y." Rev. St. § 983. In other words, the whole general
law establishing the principles upon which costs are or are not taxa-
· ble as between party and party is adopted, and this statute only pre-
scribes the items that may be taxed in the hill. And here, now, and
1n eve1·y equity case when the court comes to adjudge costs, it will
determine what costs and to which party they are taxable; and this
not alone upon two words in one section, but upon the whole statute
and the general law which it adopts. `
_. But, upon an implication based upon the use of two indefinite-