GooDYEAR v. SAWYER. 9
we have for scire facias,fm· each deposition,fcr services rendered in
appeal eases, etc. This shows that the docket fee is general, and the
time when it may bc taxable is designed to be expressed as “cn the final
hearing," and not a charge for services then and there rendered.
Bev. St. § 824. V W `A i` A
Indeed, this act of congress intends only, by such phraseology, to
prohibit inte1·lccutm·y costs to be taxed for fees paid to attorneys, so-
licitors, and proctors, as, but forthe statute, they might be. lt does
not prohibit interlocutory costs to be taxed and paid for services of
clerks, marshals, and commissioners, and it is the constant practice
to allow them, on continuances, the overruling of demurrers, hear-
ings on the suflicieiicy of pleas, etc. But as to his attorneys, solic-
itors, and proctors, the prevailing party must await the jnul dccrce
as to ccsts—:tnd this is not necessarily that decree made at the hear-
ing on the merits, for often the decree for costs comes long after that--
and then take a lump sum for all the services. If his case be at law,
and there has been ajury trial, $J0; if a judgment without a jury,
$10; and if a discontinuance, $5. If his case bein admiralty (ex-
cept in a special case mentioned in the proviso) or equity, always
$20, whenever the case is "nnally heard" as to costs. There is, by
this construction, no distinction between cases at law or in equity as
to tl1e rule that only jirtat and no interlocutory costs shall be allowed
for the attorney. They are all alike in respect of this, but for obvi-
ous reasons there are graded fees allowed by the statute in law cases,
and one sum in equity or admiralty cases, and this because of the
comparative differences in the labor of preparation. There could be
i ’ no reason for allowing a fee of $5 to be taxed when a lawsuit is dis-
continued, and none when a bill in equity is dismissed; but good
reason for allowing $5 in the one case and $20 in the other, if we
take into view the mere worth of the service. But when we consider
the rules of law which regulate both courts, as old as the law itself,
and that section 983 of the Revision adopts those rules in the plain-
est terms, and construe the whole statute together in the light of ·
the law of costs applicable to the two cases, and remember the ex-
cess of professional labor in equity over law cases, the reason of the
distinction in amount and the necessity of no distinction in the prin-
ciple of taxation at once appear. The whole statute then becomes
consistent in all things, and aligns itself completely with well-cstah-
lished principles, which are found in the law of costs as the product
of a most wise and intelligent system of legislation, as venerable and
" binding as any known to our jurisprudence.
At common law—that is, the most ancient common law—costs
were not known, but the plaintilf who made a false clamor, and
either failed to try his case, or, trying it, failed to sustain it, was
amerced heavily, and the fine went to the king as a penalty for his
invasion of a court of justice. It was the same if he took a nonsuit.
17 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 693, and authorities above cited.