28 FEDERAL nmronrnn. i
court of the United States in 1860, emphatically reatlirmed adversely to the
defendant in her own case in 1867, and decided and practically enforced
against the numerous defendants by final judgments in the Agnelly and Mons-
seaux cases, who were all warranties of the defendant, who had notice and
defended, which, by operation of law, rendered these last decrees also judg-
ments against the defendant herself.
This recital, which is but a summarization of the proceedings and
adjudications disclosed by the records in the various causes which
constitute the litigation between these parties,—this unabating and
defiant resistance to rights decreed from the beginning to have been
known, and thus solemnly and frequently declared,—abundantly
establishes that from the year 1837 to the year 1879 the defendant,
with her large resources and power, by unconscionable proceedings,
has kept the complainant from the possession of this property, with
no conceivable object save the exhaustion of complainant and the
consequent retention, as against the defendants vendees, of the $500,-
000 which the defendant had in the year 1837 received for this prop-
erty, and the evasion of her just liability for fruits. That this is a
fault of an aggravated character, the perpetration of which has been
persisted in beyond all precedent, cannot be doubted. Civil Code,
arts. 2315, 2324; Irish v. Wright, 8 Rob. 428, 432; Smith v. Ber-
wick, 12 Rob. 20, 25. That this wrong has been committed under
the guise of judicial proceedings cannot exempt from liability. He
who, with a motive to deprive another of that which he knows is
justly that other’s, employs the process and machinery of the courts,
is under obligation to satisfy all damages which that other thereby
suffers. The damages springing from the legitimate exercise of legal
rights, even when there is an absence of malice, and there is good
faith, must at least consist in placing the injured party in the situa-
tion in which he would have been if the disturbance had not taken
place. Gray v. Lowe, 11 La. Ann. 392, 393; Sellick v. Kelly, 11
Rob. 150; Horn v. Bayard, 11 Rob. 263, 264; Moore v. Withcuburg,
13 La. Ann. 22.
The case of Dyke v. Walker, 5 La. Ann. 519, illustrates the extent to
which damages are allowed for injury effected by litigation, for there
plaintiffs were allowed compensation for being compelled to go to
protest and for loss of credit. When a party makes use of judicial
procedure in bad faith, he is subjected to a peculiar and severer rule
in the assessment of damages.
The liability of a corporation, municipal or other, for the wrongful
and injurious acts of its officers and agents when acting within the
scope of their authority, or when the corporation has ratified their
acts, is, under the law of Louisiana., settled. 1l1cGary v. City of La-
jayctte, 12 Rob. 668; S. C. 4 La. Ann. 440; Rabassa v. Navigation
p C0. 5 La. 463, 464; Wilde v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 15;
and Gaines v. City qt New Orleans, 6 Wall. 716.
Nor does it diminish the liability of the defendant that she has, in