*38 e V rnnuuan aaroarn.
UnitedStates is not bound by any statute of limitations not imposed
by congress, or chargeable with laches. V
The following cases, cited by counsel for plaintiff, abundantly sup-
port this general doctrine: U. S: v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720;
Gibsoav. Chouteau, 13 lVall. 92; Gausscn v. U. S. 97 U. S. 584; U.
S. V. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486. _ i `
‘ t These are all, it is true, actions at common law, but the same doc-
trine must, no doubt, prevail in equity, where the statute of limita-
tion is sought to be interposed, in analogy to a like limitation at law. ·
Unless, therefore, this defense can be supported upon some principle
of equity jurisprudence, separate and distinct from any state statute
of limitations, and from any considerations based alone uponthe
laches of the public agents of the government, it must fail, however
disastrous to the rights of innocent parties, and however inequitable
the consequences may be. q » — .
We are thus brought to the consideration of the question whether
a lapse of time so great as to afford a clear presumption that allthe
witnesses to the transaction in controversy are dead, and all proof
lost or destroyed, will of itself constitute a bar to a suit in equity,
independently of any statute of limitations, and without regard to
any question of lachesj or, in other words, should a court of equity
refuse to entertaina bill in equity upon the sole ground that the lapse
of time has been so great as to make it impossible to ascertain the
facts and apply the remedy,`by reason of the death of the witnesses
and the loss or destruction of proofs? In my judgment, the doctrine
that a court of equity will not entertain a claim so stale as to benot
capable of satisfactory proof, must stand as one applicable alike to
all suitors; it rests not upon any statute of limitations, nor upon
any doctrine of lachcs alone, although the fact of laches may always
appear; it rests rather upon the sound rule that no court should ever
entertain a controversy after the ravages of time have destroyed the
evidence concerning it. A party called upon to answer to a charge
of fraud committed by his ancestors, or those through or under whom
he claims, more than 40 years before the commencement of the
suit, need not plead the technical bar ofthe statute of limitations or
the laches of the complainant; it is enough if he alleges that the
claim is stale, and insists that by reason of the long delay in bring-
ing suit the witnesses by whom he might have explained the transac-
tion are dead. To compel him to submit his rights to adjudication
under such circumstances would be abhorrent to the·principles of
equity, not because“of anystatutory bar or any laches merely, butche-
icause the great lapse of time is evidence against the complainant and
in favor of the defendant, and because it is contrary to equity and good
conscience that any person should be brought into court to answer
for a fraud alleged to have been committed by others before he was
born, and so long agoas to make it impossible for him to End living
‘ witnesses who have personal- knowledge of the facts. Under such