40. V FEDERAL REPORTER.
ing of it, upon the suggestion of a construction of a will different from that
held by the parties concerned, and aequiesced in by them throughout all this
time." ` i "
In Brown v. O0. of Buena Vista, 95 U. S. 161, the same doctrine
is expressed in these words:
"The lapse of time carries with it the memory and life of witnesses, the
muniments of evidence, and other means of proof. The rule which gives it
the effect prescribed is necessary to the peace, repose, and welfare of society.
A departure from it would open an inlet to the evils intended to be ex-
cluded."
In Ilarwooii iv. Railroad Co. 17 Wall. 7 8, the doctrine is concisely
and clearly stated thus:
" Without referring to any statute of limitations, the courts have adopted
the principle that the delay which will defeat a recovery must depend upon
the particular circumstances of each case."
In Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 94, the court said:
**Bnt there is a defense peculiar to courts of equity, founded on lapse of
time and the staleness of the claim, where no statute of limitations covers
the case. In such eases courts of equity act upon their own inherent doctrine
of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, and refuse to
inte1·fere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting the claim, or long
acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights."
In Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 248, the rule is thus laid down:
‘A court of chancery is said to act on its own rules in regard to stale de-
mands, and independent of the statute; it will refuse to give relief where a
party has long slept on his rights, and where the possession of the property
claimed has been held in good faith, without disturbance, and has greatly in-
creased in value."
In Wilson v. Antlzony, 19 Ark. 16, cited with approvalby the su-
preme court of the United States in Sullivan v. Railroad Co. 94 U. S.
811, the doctrine is well stated thus:
•· The chancellor refuses to interfere, after an unreasonable lapse of time,
from considerations of public policy, and from the ditliculty of doing entire
justice when the original transactions have become obscured by time, and the
evidence may be 1ost."
V And see Elmendorjf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 173; Hume v. Beale’s
Ea:’r, 17 Wall. 343; Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 465; Godden v. Kim-
mell, 99 U. S. 210.
Numerous other authorities might be cited to the same effect, but
these are sutiicient. In view of these authorities, and upon reason, I
hold it to be a. general principle of equity that lapse of time may
constitute a sufhcient defense, even in the absence of any statute of
l1m1tat1ons, and without necessary reference to any question of laches.
Such being the law, it is clear that lapse of time may be a sufficient
defense to a suit instituted in the name of the government.
It_1s_ well settled that when the United States becomes a party to
a. suit 1D the courts, and voluntarily submits its rights to judicial de-