,12   . FEDERAL nuroaras.
prescribe a uniform rule is one which can act for the whole country.
Its non·action in such cases is, therefore, equivalent to a declaration
that such commerce shall be free from state interference. "There
would otherwise be," as said in County of Mobile v. Kimball, "no se-
- curity against conflicting regulations of different states, each dis-
criminating in favor of its own products and citizens, and against the
products and citizens of other states. But it is a matter of public
history that the object of vesting in congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the states, was to insure
uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state
legislation." 102 U. S. 697. See, also, Cooley v. Board of Wardcns
of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3
· Wall. 713; Walton v. State, 91 U. S. 275.
Of the second class, are all those subjects which can be best reg-
ulated-by local authority, such as harbor pilotage, and the placing
of buoys and beacons to guide ships to the proper channel in enter- ~
ing bays and harbors. Action bythe states upon such subjects is
not deemed any encroachment upon the power of the general govern-
‘ ment; but when congress acts with respect to them, the authority of
the state is superseded.
It follows, from these views, that, witlnrespect to all interstate or
foreign commerce, the railroadcommissioners have no authority to
interfere. Congress has prescribed all the regulations which are per-
missible, so far as that commerce is carried on in vessels. Those reg-
ulations, it is true, are principally designed to insure safety in the
navigation of the vessels, and the protection and health of their of-
ficers andcrews. Congress has not attempted to prescribe what
charges may be made for the carriage of persons and merchandise in
vessels geconsidering, perhaps, that they were more likelylto be regu-
lated upon just and equitable principles by competition than by leg-
islation. Whatever the reason, congress has not seen lit to act upon
that subject. . »
With respect to purely domestic commerce carried on by these ves-
sels, the commissioners possess all the authority which thestate can
confers r But when can the vessels, in carrying persons and merchan-
dise between different ports in the state, be held to be engaged in
commerce purely domestic ? for there is a commerce within the state
which does not come within that designation. We answer that they
are not so engaged when they take up persons or merchandise to carry
to a destination within the state from a place without it, or they
take up persons or merchandise in the state to carry to a place with-
out its limits. This is the purport of the decision of the supreme
court in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557. That vessel
was engaged in shipping and transporting down Grand river, in
- Michigan, goods destined and marked for other states than Michi-
gan, andgin receiving and transporting up the river goods brought
within the state from without its limits. But as her agency in the