18 rlnmmn nmonrmn.
overturned by means of a reliquidation, or otherwise. It is not
claimed that there was any fraud in this case; nor at the expiration
of the year from the date of entry, or at the time of the last reliqui-
dation on March-3, 1881, was there any existing protest. By the
words "in the absence of protest," the statute means the absence of
any existing protest pending and in force at the expiration of the
year or at the date of the proposed reliquidation; that is, a protest
upon which proceedings are then pending, or which may serve as
the basis of some future appeal to the secretary, or of some suit in
the courts.
In this case, after the secretary’s Hrst decision, and the reliquida-
tion made under it, in accordance with the defendants protest and
appeal, no further protest or appeal, either to the secretary or to the
courts, was taken, or could be legally taken, by the defendant, because
that decision had sustained all the defendant’s claim asset forth in
his protest; and by section 2931 that decision incontestably became
"iinal and conclusive" upon him. The former protest was, therefore,
wholly spent; so that at the expiration of the year from the date of
entry, there was no protest which had any vitality, or which could
by any possibility become the basis of any further proceedings. It
had been completely disposed of by the secretary’s decision and
order sustaining it, and by the reliquidation under- that order, and
the settlement and payment made in accordance with it. The first
two entries, therefore, come within the limitation of this section, and
the subsequent reliquidation of March 3d, as respects them, was un-
authorized and void upon this ground. y
The third entry, that of April 10, 1880, was less than a year prior
to the reliquidation of March 3, 1881, upon which the present suit 1B
based. This action, however, was not commenced until August fol-
lowing, whichwas more than a year from the date of entry. If sec-
tion 21 above quoted is interpreted as being strictly a statute of
limitations, restricting the commencement of suits to one year after
the date of entry, then this action would be barred as respects the
A third entry also. I do not think, however, that was the intention, or
would be the proper construction, of this section. As was said in
‘ U. S. v. Campbell, 10 Fun. Bar. 822, the statute is in the nature or
a statute of limitations, as respects the remedy of the government by
reliquidation, and limits that remedy, after settlement, to one year
from the date of entry; but the statute makes no reference to the
commencement of suits; it declares only ‘*that such entry and pas-
sage free of duty, and such settlement of duties, shall *‘ * * be
final and conclusive upon all parties ;" this is, if no proceeding be
taken by either party to avoid the effect of "such settlement of duties,"
the settlement so made shall, after one year, in the absence of fraud
or protest, be final and conclusive. Until the lapse of. a year such
settlement of duties is not binding or conclusive. A reliquidation is
the first step in the collection of additional duties, and in preventing