Umrsn srurns v. Lime. 19
the prior settlement from becoming binding and conclusive upon the
government. Such reliquidation, therefore, if lawfully made within
the year, vacates and annuls the former "settlement," and hence the
statute no longer applies. If a higher duty be thereby assessed, a
valid obligation of the importer to the United States becomes thereby
legally ascertained and fixed by the collector, as the tribunal author-
ized to determine it, (13 How. 488;) and upon this obligation, thus
fixed and determined within the year, I think the government may
sue at any time afterwards. U. S. v. Comarota, 2 FED. Bar. 145.
The defense based upon section 21 of the act of 1874, therefore, fails,
in my judgment, as respects the entry of April 10, 1880. `
It is necessary, therefore, to consider, as respects the third entry, r
the validity of the liquidation of March 3d, based upon the order of
the secretary of the treasury made February 24:, 1881, contrary to
his decision upon the importer’s appeal, and his order announcing
that decision made in November preceding.
The order of February 24th was not itself put in evidence, so that
it does not appear whether that order was intended to be made as a
part of the appellate proceeding under section 2931, or under some
other general or particular authority of the secretary of the treasury.
The absence of the order is not, however, very material, as I am sat-
isiied that the decision on appeal, after it had been once duly made
and promulgated by the secretary’s order, and actedon by a_re-
liquidation of duties accordingly, could (1) neither be set aside, col-
laterally by any subsequent and independent order, nor (2) recalled
and reversed as a part of the appellate proceeding. .
‘ 1. There can be no question, as it seems to me, that the secretary, in ”
hearing appeals under section 2931, acts as a special statutory tribunal,
of a quasi judicial character, for the determination of the questions
brought before him in accordancewith the provisions of that section,
and that such was the intention of the statute. Under his general pow-
ers he is not a liquidating oiiicer, and though he may make rulings and .
give a construction to the tariff laws binding upon his subordinates,
(section 2652,) he is not authorized to assess duties upon particular im-
portations, because that duty is specially charged upon the collector, t
(sections 2621, 2930,) and the statute makes the collector’s decision
Hnal andconclusive upon the importer, unless an appeal be duly taken.
It is only by virtue of such an appeal that the secretary acquires juris-
diction of_that proceeding. The hearing before him is, therefore,
purely appellate ;. and his jurisdiction and powers in deciding this ap-
peal do not differ from those which any other person would have who
was appointed by statute to determine it. The hearing is based upon
specihc exceptions stated in the protest and appeal, which are required
by statute to "set forth distinctly and specifically the grounds of objec-
tion" to the collector’s decision. The questions presented are mainly
judicial in their character, and relate to the construction of the tariff
law, the classidcation of goods and the rate of duty,+a1l questions