20 ·— FEDERAL nnponrnn.
asito valuemerely having been previously determined, (section 2930,)
` -—and the decision of the appeal is made iifllldl and conclusive," save
only the provision for a suit by the importer in the circuit court.
These features show that the appellate proceedings must be classed
with those of a quasi judicial character before a special statutory of-
ficer or tribunal; and their force, except as otherwise prescribed by
statute, must therefore be construed according to the law applicable
to such tribunals. In the case of Lawrence v. Caswell, 13 How. 488,
TANEY, C. J., referring to the collector’s decision, says:
"Wh‘ere no protest is made, the duties are not illegally exacted in the legal
sense of the term, * * * but paid in obedience to the decision of the
‘ tribunal to which the law has coniided the power of deciding the question."
Nichols v. U.· S. 7 Wall. 127; U. S. v. Campbell, 10 FED. REP. 819.
The general rules of law applicable to the determinations of such
special tribunals are well settled. Except as otherwise provided by
statute, their decisions are binding and conclusive adjudications upon
i all the parties to the proceeding, like the judgment of a court of
record; and this is so independent of any express statutory provision
making them final. When a statute creates a special tribunal to deter-
mine a class of questions, it is a necessary implication that the de-
terminationsare intended to have force and validity, otherwise the
whole proceeding would be vain and useless, (Tappan v. U. S. 2
Mason,·404; Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 335;) and to give them valid-
ity at all, there is no alternative but to make them final, except with
such limitations as the statute itself prescribes. v
'· It is a universal principle," says BALDWIN, J., in U. S. v. Arredonolo, 6
Pet. 729, " that when poweror jurisdiction is delegated to any public oiiicer
or tribunal over a subject-matter, and its exercise is confided to his or their
discretion, the acts so done are binding and valid as to the subject-matter,
and individual rights will not be disturbed collateral1y for anything done in
the exercise of that discretion within the authority and power conferred.
The only questions which can arise between an individual claiming a right
· under theracts done and the public, or any person denying its validity. are
power in the oilicer and fraud in the party. All other questions are settled
by the decision made or the act done by the tribunal or oihcer, whether ex-
ecutive, legislative, judicial, or special, unless an appeal is provided for, or
other revision by some appellate or supervising tribunal is prescribed by
law." ‘ ‘ ‘ (
This expression of the law has been repeatedly aihrmed by the su-
- preme courtas applied to appraisements of value for-the purpose of
assessing duties. Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263; Belcher v. Linn,
24 How. 522. Section 2931, in declaring that the secretary’s decis-
ion shall be "final and conclusive,” only enacts expressly the ordi-
nary rule of law applicable to such tribunals. The government,
moreover, is plainly a party to the proceeding. The whole contro-
versy is between the government and the importer or owner, as ap-
pellant. By the ordinary rule, therefore, as well as by the language
of section 2931, the government, as a party to the proceeding, is bound
by the decision.