UNITED sums v. Lune. 21
` For the plaintiif it is contended that the words "iinal and conclu-
sive" should be applied only to the importer or owner, and not be
construed to bind the government; and the construction given tothe
same words in the preceding part of the same section, as to the ef-
fect of the collector’s decision, is appealed to in support of that con- ·
tention. But the two clauses are/not similar. The collector’s de-
cision is declared to be "final and conclusive" only "as to all persons
interested in the goods ;" and a reference to prior statutes shows con-
clusively that only the owner, importer, etc., are referred to by the
words "persons interested in the goods," (see Act of March 3, 1857,
§ 5; 11 St. at Large, 195,) and that those words are not intended to
include the United States. It is by reason of this very limitation,
and the statutory expression of the limited effect of the collector‘s
decision, that his decision is held not to prevent a subsequenteliqui-
dation. U. S. v. Phelps, 17 Blatchf. 312, 316. A But there is no such
limitation of the effect of the decision of,·the secretary of the treas—
ury on appeal. It is made "nnaland conclusive," without qualiflca- A
tion, (except in a particular suit,) and without being restricted, like
the colleetor’s decision, to one of the parties only; and it must,
therefore, be held to be binding on both parties alike,——i. c., upon the
government as well as the importer,-———subjeet only to the qualifica-
tion stated. .
The clause in the statute next following the-words “iinal and con-
clusive," viz., "and the goods shall be liable to duty or exempted
therefrom acccrdingly," further shows the intention that the decision
shall be binding on the government as well as on the importer; and
this intention is indicated still more emphatically by the additional ·
language of the original acts from which the revision is made, which
declare that "the goods shall be liable to duty or exempted therefrom,
accordingly, any act of congress to the contrary notwithstandi11g,"—
Act of March 3, 1857, § 5, (11 St. at Large, 195;) Act of June 30,
1864, § 14, (13 St. at Large, 214,)-that is, no matter what other
statute or apparent powers might seem to authorize a different or
further determination, the secretary’s decision on appeal shall stand - »
‘ as the final determination of the amount of duty payable, except only
such furtherdeterminaticn as maybe had in a suit brought as there
prescribed. Per Bnyrcniroan, J., in U. S. v. Oousinery, 7 Ben. 255,
approved by the chief justice in Watt -v. U. S. 15 Blatchf. 33. In
omitting the last clause in the Revision, it is not to be supposed that
congress intended any change in the effect of the secretary‘s decision
on appeal. ’  
However extensive may be the general powers of the secretary of
the treasury, in his supcrintendence ofthe collection of the revenue,
(sections 248, 249, 251, 2652,) they cannot authorize any acts in con-
flict with the particular provisions of section 2931, or with the bind;
ing effect of his decision on appeal, as prescribed by that section and
the general rules of law. The goods could not be "liable to duty ac- ·
l