22 V FEDERAL nnronrsn.
cordiugly," t. e., according to hisldecision upon the appeal, and not
otherwise, "any act of congress to the contrary notwithstanding," if
be might lawfully direct a different duty to be assessed through any
subsequent and independent order.
Considering, moreover, that the decision of the appeal is committed
to the head of the treasury department; that the government is there-
by in a sense the judge in its own case; that the secretary, in the per-
formance of his duties, is aided by permanent and learned experts in
the interpretation of the tariff laws, and in guarding the interests
of the revenue; and that in practice, by reason of the importer’s sub-
sequent right of suit, every doubt on the hearing is resolved in favor
of the government,——it would seem irrational and extraordinary if the
decision of such a tribunal, the highest oiiicer in the department and
the special guardian of the revenue, should have no binding force on
the government itself.
Under section 2930 the decision of the merchant appraisers on ap-
peal, or, if they do not agree, then the decision of the collector,
as to the value of the goods, is in like manner declared to be
"nnal." The United States, though not named, are, nevertheless,
held to be bound by the decision equally with the importer, so that
the valuation as thus fixed cannot be again inquired into, either by
the secretary or by the courts, in any subsequent suit. Tucker v. Kane,
Taney, Dec. 146; Stairs v. Peasleé, 18 How. 521, 527; Iasigl v. The
Collector, 1 Wall. 375, 383; Tappan v. U. S. 2 Mason, 398; Morris
v. Maxwell, 3 Blatchf. 143; Wills v. Russell, 1 Holmes, 228. The
provisions of section 2931, and of the acts of 1851 and 1864, above
quoted, are more emphatic as to the nnality of the secretary’s decision
than those of section 2930, as to the appraiser’s decision on appeal,
and I can perceive no reason why the former should not be held to
be as binding upon the government as the latter.
The only later statute to which I have been referred as authority
for any subsequent order for the re-examination or reliquidation
of the duties is the act of March 3, 1875, (1 Supp. Rev. St. 172.)
- The nrst proviso of section 1 of that act provides that the secretary
may authorize a re—examination and reliquidation whenever he "shall
be of opinion that such duties have been assessed and collected un-
der an erroneous view of the facts in the case, and make such refund
in accordance with existing laws as the facts so ascertained shall, in
his opinion, justify; but no such reliquidation shall be allowed, un-
less protest and appeal shall have been made as required by law."
The title of the act, the context of the proviso, and the express
prohibition of any such reliquidation, "un1ess protest and appeal
shall have been made, as required- by law," show conclusively that
no "re-examination and reliquidation," in the interest of the govern-
ment, are designed or authorized by this proviso; but only a reliqui-
dation demanded by and for the benefit of the importer- or owner.
· This proviso, therefore, cannot apply to a case like this, where an
'