24 FEDERAL REPORTER. . V
because such a review in the latter proceeding has no such statutory
basis or authority. The very language of the statute, making the de-
cision “flnal and conclusive," would seem of itself to forbid any such
review; for so long as any such right of review exists at the option
of the secretary, surely the decision made on appeal is not "i.inal and
conclusive;" and if he may recall and reverse it once, he may do so
indefinitely, until cut off by the act of 1874 above cited. The effect
of such a rule would be that the decision on appeal would have no
quality of finality whatever, and the language of the statute would
beset at naught. ‘ .
If the analogy of appeals to the merchant appraisers be consid-
ered, it has never been held, so far as I can learn, that the report of
the latter, after it has been rendered and the duties liquidated ac-
cordingly, could be recalled and modified. No statute countenances
_ such a proceeding, and all the decisions above quoted, holding the
report final as to the valuation, imply the contrary.
In the absence of any statutory power to recall and review his de-
cision, the same rule must apply to the decisions of the secretary of i
the treasury under section 2931. So long as the appellate proceedings
are pending before him and remain in his hands, any decision ar-
_ rived at is, of course, inchoate only; but when this decision has been
promulgated by order and sent back to the collector, and, as in this
case, acted upon by a reliquidation of the duties accordingly,·then, if
ever, the decision becomes "1inal and conclusive," and cannot be re-
viewed or set aside by him, nor be otherwise reversed than in the
suit authorized by section 2931.
This, again, is in conformity with the general rule of law on this
subject applicable to special statutory tribunals. By the general
rule such tribunals, when they have once rendered their decisions,
become functus ojicio as to the particular proceeding, and having no
longer any jurisdiction of it, cannot recall or reverse `their decision.
i The subject has often arisen in the courts of this state in refer-
ence to various special statutory tribunals of a quasi judicial charac-
ter, and the decisions are all to the above effect.
In the case of Jermaine v. Waggencr, 1 Hill, 279, where canal com-
missioners were authorized to adopt a plan for the construction of ’
the Crooked Lake canal, and the commissioners, having adopted such
plan pursuant to statute, undertook to modify it by the allowance of
I a substitute for a portion of it, the court held that their latter acts
were null and void. The court (Cowan, J.) says, (p. 284:) "The
commissioners having once passed upon the question, their powers
» were at an end. These powers were quasi judicial. The adoption
of a specific plan was but another name for the rendition of a judg-
ment by a court of limited jurisdiction. Such a step is, in its nat-
. ure, irrevocable, and incapable of modihcation." It was claimed
that third persons should be protectedwbo had acted under the new
directions of the commissioners, but the court say, (p. 285:)