Uurrnn surus v. Lune. 25
·* That rule certainly cannot apply to a case where the judicial body is lim-
ited to a single act, and has become junctus ojtcio by its performance. Ju-
risdiction over the subject-matter thus ceases, and must be regarded, for all ‘
purposes, as if it never existed."
The principle is the same although the board be apermanent one,
to hear appeals of a certain class, where its jurisdiction is plainly
special and limited. A
In the case of Woolsey v. Tompkins, 23 Wend. 324, where the judges
0f_ the court of common pleas sat as an appellate court to review the
proceedings of commissioners in laying out highways, Nurjson, J.,
says, (p. 327 :) "The reversal of the order of the commissioners and
determination to lay out the road were quasi judicial acts, and could
not be revuwed or altered by the judges;" though it was held that they
might amend clerical mistakes in the record of their proceedings.
The rule has been applied in the case of assessors undertaking to
change assessments, (Clark v. Norton, 58 Barb. 434;) to the action of
a board of supervisors upon reapportioning taxes, (see People v. Bd.
Sup’rs Co. of Schenectady, 35 Barb. 408, where Porrnn, J., in his opin-
ion, reviews most of the authorities in this state ;) to the marine court of
this city, as an inferior court, and its inability to vacate its own judg-
ments, (Martin v. The Mayor, etc., 20 How. Pr. 86; The People, etc., v.
The Marine Court, 12 Wend. 220;) to a referee’s changing his report
after it is once signed and declared, (Ayrault v. Sackett, 17 How. Pr. t
507;) and to a rehearing by a justice of the peace, (People v. Lynde,
8 Cow. 133.)
These decisions do not rest upon any statutory provision making
the action or decision of such special tribunals " Hnal and conclu-
I sive." They all proceed upon an 'inherent want of power in such
tribunals to recall or modify their judgments when once made and
declared; because, having performed their statutory duty, they lose
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and are functus qgjicio.
- The appellate jurisdiction of the secretary of the treasury under
section 2931 is of the same special, statutory, and `limited character;
like that of the judges of the common pleas over commissioners of
highways, in the case of Woolsey v. Tompkins, above cited, or such
as the judges of the supreme court in this state were formerly sup-
posed to exercise over the commissioners of real estate and assess-
ment or taking land for streets in the city of New York. So long
as it was held that the judges of the supreme court, in reviewing
such proceedings, did not act as the supreme court of the constitu-
tion, but only as commissioners of review, under a special statutory
power, it was held that these judges could not recall or change a de-
cision once made by them. Matter of the`Mayor, etc., 6 Cow. 571;
In re Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill, 14. `
Even the United States courts, it is held, have no power, in the
absence of statutory provisions, to review or annul their own final
decrees after the expiration of the term at which they are rendered. ·