48 FEDERAL Bmrommn.
V Wnrs, C. J., held, in Deems v. Albany at Canal Line, 14 Blatchf. 474,
that the decree in the circuit court should be made without com-
pounding the interest on the damages, and without allowing it upon
the costs.
The practice has been uniform in this court, from a time whereof,
etc., to give interest on the whole decree.
I agree, of course, that the decree here is a new decree, and not.
technically speaking, merely an affirmance of that below, (The Lu-
cille, 19 Wall. 73;) and that interest, in the admiralty, is not an in-
evitable consequence of aihrmanceyas it is by the statute and rules
` in some other courts. Hemmenway v. Fisher, 20 How. 255. There
is no reason to depart from the ordinary practice in this case, and
the only question is to ascertain that practice. U `
’I am of opinion that the practice here has been and is sound, to
award interest on the whole decree below, unless the circumstances
of the case give rise to a variation upon grounds ofijustice and equity.
Lord Szrownml twice decided that it is just and usual to allow in-
terest upon interest in casessubstantially like this. ,The Driver, 15
Rob. 145; The Dundee,2 Hagg. 137. The latter decision is cited
with approval by Cmrrorm, J., in The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600, 613.
Interest is given for delay in satisfying the decree, not as part of the
original damages. For instance, the considerable bill of costs in
this case is made up almost wholly of cash paid out by the libelants
before the decree was rendered. Why should they not have interest
for the delay in repaying it? Again, if the decree had simply re-
mained unexecuted in the district court, no appeal being taken, the
whole decree must be paid, with interest. Such is the command of
the writ of execution in that court. Why should the libelants, in ad-
dition to the necessary expenses of the appeal, lose a part of the ben-
eiit of the decree?
In this case the damages were computed with as much accuracy
and regard to positive value as 'if it had been an action of contract.
In cases of that sort I understand the general rule to be that interest
should be allowed on the verdict or the judgment, at least when the
delay has been caused by the act of the defendant. See Bev. St. §
966; Pub. St. Mass. c. 171,§ 8; Gen. Rule 29, Sup. Ct. U. S.; Perkins
v. Foarniquet, 14 How. 328; In re European Cent. Ry. Co. 4 Ch. Div.
33; 2 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) 194; 1 Suth. Dam. 711. There is no
question here of a second compounding of interest by the running of
interest on this decree. The case cannot go to the supreme court,
and the money is ready for the libelants. Interest is allowed on the
whole decree below.