4 FEDERAL REPORTER.,
are, in no sense of the word, contracts," and hence are not within
the act of congress. While it may be true that a lien per se is not
a contract, yet all liens of the nature set forth in the bill in this
action arise and are based upon contract, express or implied. The
lien itself is merely an instrumentality, a special remedy given, by
which the contract may be enforced. The assignment of a mere _lien
would be idle—would confer no right of action upon the assignee
tl1ereof—if such assignment did not also transfer the debt secured by
the lien. A debt is a sum of money due upon contract, express or
implied, or established by judgment. The debt transferred is the sub-
stantial thing; the lien is an incident thereto,—a statutory remedy
which the assignee may pursue, or he may wave it and pursue his
common-law remedy, to recover the debt. The lien itself may expire
by limitation, if suit be not commenced to enforce it within six
months after the same has been nled for record. St. Nev. 1875, c.
64, § 8. But the debt would not be extinguished by the expiration of
the lien, and it could be enforced by proper remedy. The statute
above cited cannot bear the construction sought to be put upon it.
. Section 5 of the act makes it obligatory upon the lien-claimant that
he state in his claim, the "terms, time given, and conditions of his
contract;" and the entire act is based upon the supposition of a con- ·-
tract, express or implied, between the parties. The words "contrac-
tor, " "subcontractor," "debt," "credit0r," etc., are of constant recur-
rence in the act. And it is not clear how a state can authorize or
empower one person to charge an arbitrary lien against the property
of another person, no privity, or contract, express or implied, exist-
ing between such persons. Without considering this objection fur-
ther, it will be sufficient to observe that this action is certainly brought
to enforce the terms of a contract fully set forth in the bill of com-
plaint, As it does not appear from the amended bill that any of
these nine original lienholders, whose citizenship is not set forth,
could have maintained an action in this court to foreclose or enforce
any of those liens, it follows that their assignee could not do so. On
this point there is no conflict in the decisions.
We do not deem it necessary to decide whether or not this action
could be maintained by complainant, as the assignee of J. G. Hamp-
ton, J. C. Hampton & Co., and S. W. Lee, intermediate assignees of
a portion of the liens, they being presumably citizens of Nevada, and
defendant being a Nevada corporation. The decisions on this point
seem to be somewhat conflicting. Bradley v. Rhine? Adm’rs, 8 Wall.
396; Mellen v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537; Morgan'.; E:c’r v. Gray, 19
Wall. 81. Contra, see Wilson v. Fishers Ex’rs, Bald. 133; Dundas
v. Bowler, 3 McLean, 204; Milledollar v. Bell, 2Wall. Jr. 334. But
upon the case as presented in the original and amended bills, we think
this court has no jurisdiction in this case. We call attention to the
Hfth section of the act of March 3, 1875, and to the ruling of the su-
preme court thereon, in Williams v. Nolmwa, 104 U. S. 209. It is a