01110.400, M. a sr. P. amico; v. sruwnrr. 7
test of the defendant. The property is situated very near to the
cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, both of which have grown with ·
marvelous rapidity within the past 10 years, and at the time of the
agreement it was known that the land in question was advancing in
value. It is scarcely to be presumed that defendant intended to
bind himself to sell his land in October for its appraised value in the
previous April, and if not, he must have understood that the arbitra-
tor was to act at once, or at least without unnecessary delay. · That
such was his understanding is apparent from the fact which iap-
pears in evidence that he urged the arbitrator to accept the duty and
proceed to act soon after his appointment, which the latter declined
to d'o. After waiting some four months for action by the arbitrator,
/ the defendant concluded not to consummate the sale, and accordingly
notined the arbitrator that he objected to his acting after so long a
delay. If the arbitrator was right in assuming that the land was to
beappraised according to its value at the date of the contract, we
think defendant had a right to object to the delay. If the arbitrator
was wrong in that, then his award must be set aside on that ground.
The evidence sufticientlyshows that the land increased in value be-
tween April and October, 1879.
Nothing appears on the face of the agreement or in the evidence
to show that the parties to the contract contemplated any unneces-
sary delay in making the award as to the value of the land, and it is
plain that no great delay was necessary. We do not, of course, mean
to say that the arbitrator was bound to act immediately. He was at
liberty to take a reasonable time in which to determine as to his ac-
ceptance of the trust, and thereafter a further reasonable time in
which to investigate the question of value and make his award. But
it is manifest that no great length of time was needed in which to
determine the question submitted to the arbitrator in this case. Un-
der the circumstances of the case, we do not think the delay of over
tive months was contemplated by the parties when they entered into
the contract, nor do we think it reasonable. We should, therefore,
in the exercise of the discretion which belongs to courts of equity, de-
cline to decree a specihc performance of the award, even if this were
the only objection to its validity. l ·
It is, however, further insisted that the arbitrator excluded from
consideration, in making his appraisement, the quantity of land in-
cluded in certain streets, or supposed streets, being a part of the land
to be conveyed, and of which complainant now asks a conveyance
by warranty deed. Whether there were any streets or highways
constituting easements upon the land was not a question for the ar-
bitrator to determine. The contract called for a deed of general war-
ranty against all adverse claims, except a lease mentioned therein,
and it was provided that the arbitrator should appraise the entire
tract. The arbitrator was not authorized to go into an inquiry as to
the effect upon the value of the land of the supposed public ease-