*38 mtnmmn · nmrommn. U possible. There is strong reason for maintaining this position. If a judge of a state court-—-another sovereignty as distinct from the na- tional sovereignty as if it ruled over a diiierent terrritory-—can, under the circumstances indicated, compel the production of a prisoner held under the laws of the United States,-—the supreme law of the land,-—he has the physical power to discharge him when produced, however lawless the discharge may be, as was done, in fact, in the Booth and Tarbtc Cases. The production of the body in court, by means of which the court has the physical power to assume control, is equivalent to a surrender of a prisoner. And ifone person can be discharged by a state ofhcer, so can all, and it would be impossible for the United States, in some contingencies, to discharge the duty imposed upon them by the national constitution relating to fugitives from justice, as well as to fugitives from labor, or to execute the laws of congress passed to give effect to those constitutional rights of the several states, as between themselves. It would be as dith- cult to perform their duties as the supreme court in Booths Gases said it would be to execute the criminal laws of the United States under similar conditions. By producing the body as required by the writ, the petitioner nec- essarily places his prisoner within the control of the court issuing it, and deprives himself of all power to perform the requirements of his commission, enjoined by the superior authority of the laws of the United States. He cannot, and he does not, owe a divided duty to two distinct sovereignties. He cannot serve two masters. He can- not produce his prisoner, which is equivalent to his surrender, in obedience to the commands of the writ of habeas corpus, and at the same time retain power to obey the mandate of the laws of the United States and deliver him to the authorities of the state of Ore- gon. He must obey one command or the other, and the command to.be obeyed is the one which is superior or supreme in its authority. But whether these reasons and others given are sound or not, the rule as to the jurisdiction of the state courts, under the circum- V stances indicated, appears to us to be clearly established by the high- - est tribunal in the land, and are not open even to question here, and cannot be disregarded by us. We are of opinion, under the authoritative decisions cited, that the S judge of the superior court on the petition of Bayley, as presented, had no jurisdiction to issue the writ, and certainly, upon the petition . and the return made to the writ by Robb, that neither the judge nor · the court over which he presides had jurisdiction or authority to pro· ‘ ceed further, or to compel the production of the body of Bayley, or to punish him for contempt for respectfully declining to produce the ‘ body under the circumstances of the case, in pursuance of the com- mands of the writ. We should not have thought it necessary to go into the case so fully, or to have done anything beyond referring to the Booth and