44 rmnmnn. rcmroarma.
saying that the conductor might take "his mail, but if the train goes
we are going with it," whereby the passage of said mail, mail carriage,
and carrier, was further obstructed and retarded until the arrival on
the ground of a detachment of United States soldiers, and the arrest
of the defendant by the deputy United States marshal.
In the case of U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, the defendant was
charged with arresting the carrier of the mail, and detaining the
steam-boat on which it was being carried for that purpose. The de- .
fendant, in his plea to the indictment,alleged that he made such ar-
rest as sheriif, upon a lawful warrant charging the carrier with mur-
der, and without any intent or purpose to obstruct the mail or the
passage of the steamer. Upon a demurrer to this plea, the judges
in the court below were divided in opinion as to whether the conduct
of the defendant constituted, under the circumstances, an obstruction
of the mail within the meaning of the act of congress, and certified
the question to the supreme court; The court answered the question
in the negative, saying, "that the act of congress which punishes the
retarding or obstruction of the mail or of its carrier, does not apply
to a case of a temporary detentionof the mail caused by the arrest
of the carrier upon an indictment for murder." In the course of his
opinion, Mr. Justice Finho says, substantially, that the statute only
applies to persons who do some act with a knowledge that it will re-
tard the passageof the mail and do it with that intention, but adds:
"When the acts which create the obstruction are in themselves un-
lawful, tlie intention to obstruct will be imputed to their author, al-
» ‘ though the attainment of other ends may have been his primary ob-
ject." i
That the conduct of the defendant and his associates had the ef-
fect to obstruct and retard the passage of the mail is self-evident; and
that this effect was knowingly caused by them, although it was not
the primary object of their action, is also plain enough. They di-
rectly and purposely obstructed the passage of the mail, not as an
end, it is true, but as a means of coercing the conductor to carrythem
on his train to Portland. I suppose the passage of the mail is sel-
dom obstructed, except by robbers, otherwise than as a means of at-
taining some other end. In all such cases the question to be decided
is whether the act causing the obstruction is in itself lawful? If it
is, the obstruction necessarily caused thereby is not a crime. It can
hardly be pretended, upon the facts stated, that these men who
_ stopped this train had any legal right to travel thereon without pay-
ment of their fare or the consent of the conductor. A No contract, un-
derstanding, or usage is alleged or shown, under or by virtue of which
they could claim such a privilege with a shadow of right. Because,
as they allege, the company “passed them.up," they claimed it ought
to "pass them down." There is an old adage that “0ne good turn de-
serves another, " but this application of it would make the doing of
good works dangerous to the doer. How long would it be beforethey
i ’