.14 . rnnnnan nmronrmn.  
the application ofthisrule, that under the bill filed by_the bondhold-
ers in this court, that the jurisdiction thus acquired was prior to that
obtained by the court in the Sixth circuit, under the bill filed by the
trustee, the Central Trust Company, and that, as a legal consequence,
the possession of "the res" was in law in the possession of this court
to the extent of its jurisdiction, as to which we will speak hereafter.
It further follows that the order appointing Martin receiver on the
thirty-first of October, under the bill filed by the Central Trust Com-
pany on the thirtieth of October, does not entitle- him to the cus-
tody or control of any portion of the property of the defendant com-
pany, as this court iirst acquired jurisdiction over it, and that, as a
consequence, all of his acts as such receiver, in pursuance of that or-
der, over the River Division, are a nullity, having been appointed
solely under that bill, while the acts of Receiver Sharp, having been
appointed by the court which first acquired jurisdiction over and le-
gal possession of the property, must be held to be legal and valid.
Thus far we have only considered the question of jurisdiction as
presented by the proceedings originating in the federal tribunals. We
come now to consider it upon the proceedings begun and had in the
i state court, which it is conceded were had prior to any instituted in the
federal courts. It appears that Nelson Robinson filed his bill on the
twentieth` day of September, 1883, in the court of common pleas for
Lucas county, in the state of Ohio, asking for the foreclosure of the
mortgage on the Ohio Central Railroad Company, and the appointment
of a receiver for that road; that the court exercised jurisdiction, and
appointed John E. Martin receiver, and subsequently the case was
removed to the circuit court of the United States for the Southern
district of Ohio. It was claimed in the discussion of this case by the
complainants, and scarcely controverted by the defendants, that the
court of common pleas of Lucas county had no jurisdiction over the
defendant company or its property under the statutes of Ohio, for
the reason that the defendant company did not "reside" in the county,
nor was any portion of the defendantfs property covered bythe mort-
gage found in that county. This construction of the statutes of Ohio
seems to have been adopted by the court of the Sixth circuit in the
appointment of its receiver, as Martin’s appointment was made solely
under the bill filed by the Central Trust Company. In this view of the
construction of the statute of Ohio we not only concur, but conclude
that the proceedings instituted in the court of common pleas of Lucas
county were comm mm judicc, and therefore a nullity. But the case '
is very different in the courts of the state of West Virginia. The same
bill that was nled in the court of common pleas of Lucas county in
the state of Ohio was nled in the circuit court of Mason county, in this
state,on the third day of October, 1883, at which time the defendant
company appeared to said bill, waived service of process, and John
E. Martin was appointed receiver. On the twenty-ninth day of the
same month the cause was removed-to this court and regularly dock-