my v. Anmxaunnrs az w. 12. co. 25
~ the decree is lost, and the right to bring an action upon it is gone.
What, then, is the status of the lien of the decree? A Virginia text-
writer of eminence, Prof. Minor, lays it down that the lien of a judg-
ment is suspended when the right to revive it by scirefacias or action
is lost. 2 Minor, Inst. 272. And Mr. Barton, another text-writer, has
this passage, referring to the twelfth section of chapter 182, Code 1873 :
" The right to enforce the lien of a judgment, although the statute (in sec-
tion 9) delares that it may always be enforced in a court of equity, is confined
to the time that an action may be brought, or scire facias sued out thereon,
and after that time the lien ceases to exist." See 1 Barton, Ch. Pr. 109.
The debt of Fowle, Snowden & Co. is bottomed therefore on no
lien, and is to be treated in this suit as an unsecured claim against
which a plea of the statute of limitations has not been interposed.
Coming now to a consideration of the Hay judgments. Four of
them had been assigned to Hay by the original plaintiffs after they
had been recovered. The plaintiffs in two of the four suits were cit-
izens of Massachusetts, and the judgments assigned were rendered
respectively on the twenty·Hfth of November, 1857, and on the ninth
of February, 1858. The other two of these four judgments were re- T
covered by residents of Virginia, and assigned to Hay, bearing date
on the twenty-seventh of May, 1859, but taking effect as of the six-
teenth of May, 1859. On these four judgments Hay brought an
equity suit in this court in 1875, in which he prayed that the satis-
factions which he had caused to be marked on these judgments in
1860 might be set aside, and the liens which had originally attached,
to the judgments might be restoredl Decree was obtained in this
court in 1881. It is objected to the validity of the decree that this
court had not jurisdiction as to two of the judgments, to entertain a
suit brought by Hay on them, inasmuch as the second clause of sec-
tion nrst of the judiciary act of 1865 (Supp. Rev. St. p. 174, c. 137)
declares that the circuit courts of the United States shall not have
cognizance of suits brought by assignecs of causes of action, where
their assignors could not sue. Waiving the question whether the de-
cree under consideration can be assailed collaterally, it is to be re-
marked, that the object of the equity suit brought by Hay in this
court was to set aside "satisfactions" which had been marked upon
the judgments at a time when they had become the property of Hay,
The consideration for which they had been so marked had proved '
null and void. The satisfactions had been executed on an implied
promise of the company, to Hay himself, that if the consideration-
— should fail, the company would make good the judgments. This ob-
ligation, arising ea: eqao et bono, from the company to Hay himself,
was the cause of action on which the equity suit was founded. It
was a cause of action arising directly in favor of Hay, irrespectively
of the manner in which he had acquired this property, and the juris-
diction of this court to entertain a suit by Hay, a non-resident, against
the Alexandria & Washington Company, a resident of Virginia, upon