26 A V »FEDERAL nmronrmn. .
this cause of A action which had accrued to himself was complete..
But even assuming, what is not true, that the original causes of ac-
tion on which the judgments had been obtained in the state court
were still the basis of the equity suit brought in this court, even in that
case the jurisdiction of this court was good. Two of the judgments
had been recovered by citizens of Massachusetts, the other two by
citizens of Virginia. As to the first two, the jurisdiction was un-
doubted- The owner of these brought the suit; and the only ques-
tion is, whether he had a right to join in his suit two judgments
against the same defendant which had been assigned to him with no
purposeor intention of evading the jurisdiction ofthe state court.
This question would seem to be settled by the first clause of the first
section of the act of 1875, which provides in substance that the cir-
cuit courts of the United States "shal1 have cognizance of all suits,
` etc., in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different
states, etc." The controversy of Hay respecting the judgments as to
which the jurisdiction was undoubted, gave under this clause juris-
diction of the suit which embraced two other controversies which were
not between citizens of different states. It is true that the clause of
the act of 1875, on which this objection is based, would not authorize
causes of controversy to be embraced in a suit which had been as-
signedfor the purpose of having them sued upon in a United States
courts `Section five of thesame act forbids assignments for such a
purpose ;l but this very section, by forbidding the joining of causes of
action assigned for this purpose, impliedly authorizes causes of ac-
tion not assigned for such purpose to be so embraced. If a suit is
found to embrace causes of action assigned for this purpose, the court
will dismiss it as to such causes of action, retaining it as tothe others,
as was done by the supreme court of the United States in Inhab. of
the Township of Bernards v. Stebbins, decided at the present term and
reported in 109 U. S. 341, and also in 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272. This
principle has been frequently applied as to parties by the supreme
court, in suits in which the court has held that though all the plain-
titfs and all the defendants marshaled on opposite sides of a cause,
were not residents of different states, yet if there be a separable con-
troversy between citizens of different states, that fact may of itself
give jurisdiction of the whole suit. If a separable controversy as to
' parties can bring a suit-into a federal court, there would seem to be
no reason why a separable controversy as to causes of action should
not do so; except, indeed, in suits- where a fraud upon jurisdiction
is attempted, as contemplated by section 5 of the act of 1875. These ,
four judgments having therefore been legally relieved of the "satis-
factions" that were marked upon them, and the liens which they cre-
ated having been legally restored, must take rank as of the twenty-
‘ nfth of November, 1857, the ninth of February, 1858, and the six-
teenth of May,. 1859, respectively; and must be given precedence
over the debt of Fowle, Snowdeu & Co.