5 FEDERAL REPORTER.
It has been the settled policy of this state to render titles secure, and
to afford ample means of settling all disputes in relation to them.
This policy finds expression in statutes of limitations, betterment
acts, and acts curing defective acknowledgments; and in the judg-
ments of the supreme court, expounding the jurisdiction of courts of
equity to quiet titles, and to avert and remove clouds from titles. No
statute has been passed in this state relating to the jurisdiction or
practice of equity courts in cases like the one at bar,- because the su-
preme court has steadily maintained that the jurisdiction was inher-
ent, and the rules of practice adequate, without the aid of legislation.
The federal courts have given effect to suchstatutes in other states.
Olark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195; Stark v. Storrs, 6 Wall. 402; Holland
v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15; S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495.
The defendant insists that a court of equity has no inherent juris-
diction to remove clouds from title when the land is unoccupied. It
is said such jurisdiction might be conferred by statute. It is con-
ceded the federal court would give effect to such a statute, but it is
denied that the settled rulings of the supreme court of a state main-
taining the jurisdiction are equivalent to a statute conferring it, or
that they are controlling in this court. Where the decisions of the
supreme court of a state on the subject of titles to land, or the mode
of acquiring or quieting titles thereto, are settled and uniform, they
are accepted bythe federal courts as conclusive evidence of the law
of the state on that subject, and have a binding force as nearly equiv-
alent to a positive statute as judicial decisions can have.
In a suit involving title to land, where the supreme court of the
state had adopted a rule of decision applicable to the case, the su-
preme court of the United States said:
"In accordance with well-established principles in this court, we accept
this uniform and stable body of judicial decision from the court of last resort
of the state in which the property is situated, and in which the transactions
that form the subject of this litigation took place, as conclusive testimony of
the rule of action prescribed by the authorities of the state, as applicable to
their interpretation and adjustment. We do not inquire whether a more
suitable rule might not have been adopted, nor whether the arguments which
led to its adoption were forcible O1' just. We receive the decision, having the
character that are mentioned in the extract we have made from the opinion
of the supreme court of Texas, as having a binding fo1·ce almost equivalent
to positive law." League v. Egery, 24 How. 264; Christy v. Pridgeorn., 4
Wall. 196, 204; Beauregard v. City of New Orleans, 18 How 497
In Clark v. Smith, supra, the court say:
"Propriety and convenience suggest that the practice should not materially
differ where the titles to land are the subject of investigation; and such is
the constant course of the federal courts."
And in the same case it is said the federal courts in chancery will
give effect to state legislation and state policy whenever it can be
. done without departing from what legitimately belongs to a court of
chancery. But I do not rest the case on this ground alone. The