12 FEDERAL REPORTER.
furnish him full and complete relief, his resort to equity to have a cloud re-
moved ought not to be questioned." _
The principle on which the jurisdiction is founded, and the rule for
its exercise, are admirably stated in Martin V. Graves, 5 Allen, 601,
where the court say: ·
·" Whenever a deed or other instrument exists which may be vexatiously or
injuriously used against a party after the evidence to impeach or invalidate
it is lost, or which may throw a cloud or suspicion over his title or interests,
and he cannot immediately protect or maintain his right by any course of
proceeding at law, a court of equity will afford relief by directing the instru-
ments to be delivered up and canceled, or by making any other decree which
justice and the rights of the parties may require."
In Clcnston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209, it is said:
"This is a broad and comprehensive statement of the principles ou which
such relief is granted."
And the latter case is cited approvingly in Sallivan v. Finnegan,`
101 Mass. 447, and the rule applied where the plaintiff and defend-
ant were occupying different rooms in the same house, each claiming
to_own the whole; and see Loring v. Downer, 1 McAll. 360; Bunce v.
Gallagher, 5 Blatchf. 481; S. G. 7 Amer. Law_Beg. (N. S.) 35; Young
v. Porter, 3 Woods, 342; Carroll v. Sajorcl, 441, 464. i
Some_ of the confusion and apparent conflict in the authorities
grows out of the varying provisions of state statutes. Decisions
based on statutes are cited as though they were an exposition of the
general principles of equity jurisdiction. It is highly probable some
of these statutes had their origin in a misconception of the inherent
jurisdiction and powers of courts of equity. The tendency of the
courts at first was to accept these statutes, as the measure of equity
jurisdiction in this class of cases. A ~
The case of Pier v.Clty ¢y"Fcncl dn Lac, 38 Wis. 470, isinstruct-
ive on this point. That was a suit in equity to remove a cloud cast
upon the plaintiffs title by a certificate of assessment. The bill al-
leged the plaintiff was the owner in fee of the lot, but said nothing
about the possession. ` The bill being silent on the question of pos-
session, the court assumed, forthe purposes of the case, that the lot
was unoccupied. It was contended for the defendant that the action
could only be sustained under the statute, which is as follows:
_ _ "Any person. having the possession and legal title to land may institute an
action against anyother person setting, up ;a claim thereto, and if the plain-
tiff shall be able to substantiate his titleto such land, the defendant shall be
adjudged to release to the plaintiff all claim thereto, and to pay costs, un-
less," etc. Rev. St. 1849, § 34, c. 84} Rev. St. 1858, § 29, c. 141.*  
It was conceded that if the suit could, not be maintained inde-
pendently of the statute, the plaintiffs want of, possession was fatal
to his case ;` and the court said: _ '_ _ V l
"Hence we must determine whether the action can be upheld independ-
ently of the statute. Courts of equity have inherent juris V ictionof actions to
prevention remove clouds on title to land, and have constantly.·exeroised»it