nmrmc v. Nonromz a ‘w. 11. oo. 81
must appear that the latter is responsible for the former company’s
acts, and we have found it was not. If knowledge of this fault would
entail responsibility on the defendant through acceptance of the mer-
chandise, such knowledge could not be inferred from anything shown.
The defendant, as before stated, was bound to no inquiry, and had
(so far as appears) no information on thissubject. It is unimportant
that ·tlie°defendant knew of the embarrassments at Norfolk when it
receivedthe merchandise at Bristol. Being then in transit the defend-
ant’s duty bound it to such reception. No probable benent could arise
to the shipper from refusing. In view of existing circumstances, a.
refusal might have entailed serious responsibilities. _
The cases relied upon by the plaintiff (Railroad Co. v. Manufg
O0. 16 Wall. 318, and Bussey v. Railroad C0. 13 Fun. Bar. 330) are
inapplicable. The obligations involved were those of carriers re-
ceiving merchandise from the shipper, and either undertaking to
provide means of carriage throughout,——as_ in the latter case,—or
failing to communicate knowledge (which they had) of obstacles in
the way of transportation,-—as in the former. The responsibility
arose in the one case, out of the express undertaking, and in the
other, out of the bad faith. . ` `
Such being the defendant’s obligations, did it discharge them? It
carried the merchandise safely and expeditiously to Norfolk. When
the first consignment arrived on the twenty-third of October, it was
tendered to the Merchants’ & Miners’ Steam-ship Company, and was _
refused on account of accumulation of freight on its wharves; with
the request or proposal, however, to place it and subsequent consign- I
ments on the wharf and in the warehouse of the defendant, (a place
as convenient for loading into the steam-boat company’s vessels as
on its own wharves,) and with assurance that vessels would speedily h
be provided and sent there for it. This request was complied with,
under a reasonable expectation that the steam-ship company would
load and forward the cotton without unreasonable delay. Placing
the subsequent consignment as proposed was a substantial tender.
The designation of this place for loading was a virtual designation of
the place for tender. To hold that the defendant should have hauled
the cotton which arrived on the 26th to the steam·ship company’s _
wharves, in view of what had occurred, would be unreasonable and
unjust. The fact that insurance was procured is unimportant.
Should the defendant have done more? In view of the facts it was
not required to forward by any other route, nor would it have been
justified in doing so. The steam-ship company was the carrier con-
templated by the plaintiff. Indeed, it must be regarded as having
been designated by him. If not on shipment at Memphis, it cer-
tainly was on delivery to the defendant. Those so delivering repre-
sented the plaintiff. That a preceding carrier represents the shipper
in forwarding by his successor on a through line (under ordinary cir- _
cumstances) is settled. The plaintiff’s insurance would have been