moxox v. ELLIOTT. 17
reasonable delay in enforcing his right or claim? The suit was com- _
menced on April 26, 1884. The money, for which the decree in
Hollaclay v. Elliott is claimed to be a security, was advanced to Elliott
by White atintervals of less than a year, and in almost every month
of each year, except theyear of 1878, from June 13, 1874, to March
25, 1879. It was advanced, not on account, but on an agreement to
do so, from time to time, as Elliott might demand or require it, and
but for the provision in the agreement as to the time of payment, the .
right of action against Elliott to recover the same, or any portion
thereof, would not have accrued to White until the whole amount was
delivered or advanced or offered and declined. But the agreement
for the advance or loan provides that the first $12,000 shall be re-
paid within one year from the advance of the last installment thereof,
which was made before September, 1874, and therefore the right of
action to recover this sum accrued by September, 1875, and was
barred in six years thereafter, and before the commencement of this
suit. Or. Code Civil Proc. § 6, sub. 1. The delivery of the remain-
ing $10,589.65 was completed on March 25, 1879. and without any
contract as to when it should be repaid, and therefore it became pay-
able at once; but even then the right of action to recover the same
occurred within six years before the commencement of this suit.
Upon this state of the case White could, at the commencement of this
suit, have maintained an action against Elliott to recover this second
sum, but not the first one.
But it is immaterial whether an action could now be maintained
by White against Elliott to recover this money or not. This is not
such an action, but a suit brought by a person claiming to be the
assignee of a decree to subject the property of the debtor therein to
its payment and satisfaction. And it can be maintained, although \
the right of action against Elliott to recover the money in questibn is `
barred by lapse of time. The statute bars the remedy against Elliott
in six years, but does not destroy the debt, and it still exists for the.
purpose of enforcing any lien or pledge given to secure its payment.
Quantock v. England, 5 Burr. 2628; Sparks v. Pico, 1 McAll. 497;
Myer v. Beal, 5 Or. 130; Goodwin v. Morris, 9 Or. 322; 2 Pars. r
Cont. 379; Bap. & Law. Dig. "Limitations."
Assuming, then, for the present that the plaintiff is the assignee
of the decree against Ben Holladay, and that the latter has no prop-
erty in this jurisdiction subject to execution, except that which he
has conveyed or disposed of to Joseph Holladay with intent to hinder
and delay the enforcement of said decree, the plaintiff has a clear
right to maintain this suit to set aside said. conveyance or disposition
so far as it is an obstacle in the way of such enforcement, unless he
has delayed the commencement of the same unreasonably. 3 Pom.
Eq. Jur. § 1415; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 60. ,
The only questions tl1at Elliott can litigate in this case are his in- I
debtedness to White and the assignment to the plaintiff, both of which
v.22F,no.1—2