18 rmnmun nsronmn.
are confessed by his demurrer, subject to the objection that they are
void for champerty. The indebtedness of Ben Holladay to the owner
of the decree against him is also admitted, and the only other ques-
tion open to contest in the case is the validity of the transfers and
conveyances to Joseph Holladay, and the extent of EBinger’s claim
for compensation as an attorney; and the objection of laches can
only be made by said Holladay. As was said by this court in Man-
ning v. Hayden, 5 Sawy. 37 9: "In the consideration of purely equi-
table rights and titles, courts of equity act in analogy to the statute
of limitations, but are not bound by it;" and in Hall v. Russell, 3
Sawy. 515: "When an action upon a legal title to land would be
barred by the statute, courts of equity will apply a like limitation to
suits founded upon equitable rights to the same property." As has
- been said, so far as Joseph Holladay is concerned, this is a suit to
set aside certain transfers and conveyances to him by Ben Holladay,
so far as may be necessary to satisfy the decree against him, on the
ground that they were made with intent, to hinder and delay the
plaintiff in the enforcement of the same, contrary to the statute of
frauds, (Or. Laws, 528, § 51; 13 Eliz. c. 5;) and upon the question
of time is analogous to an action to recover the possession of the
property, and ought ordinarily to be considered as barred within the
same time as such action. An action to recover the possession of
real property is not barred in this state until 10 years from the time
the right to maintain it accrues, (Sess. Laws 1878, p. 22;) and an
action to recover the possession of personal property, or damages for
the taking or detention thereof, may be brought within six years from
the time the cause of action accrues.
The decree in question was obtained on August 15, 1879, and if
the right to maintain this suit accrued then, as I think it did, the
‘ plaintiff has not been guilty of laches. Following the analogies of
the statute as applied to actions at law, the suit was commenced in
time, both as to the real and personal property affected bythe alleged
invalid disposition to Joseph Holladay.
The assignment by Elliott, among other things, of all his right,
title, interest, and claim, both in law and in equity, in the firm of
Ben Holladay & C0., was valid and operative, and transferred to the
plaintiff all his interest in said firm. 1 Pom. Eq. J ur. § 168; Burr.
Assignm.§ 100. It also gave him the option to make himself a
party to the litigation then pending between Elliott and his partners
in said Erm, to ascertain and determine their respective interests
therein and liabilities thereto, or to allow it to proceed in the name of
the assignor for his benent. Ex parte Railroad Oo. 95 U. S. 226.
But counsel for Joseph Holladay insists that this "secret assign-
ment was a fraud upon the courts," and ought not, therefore, to be up-
held. But this assertion is certainly unfounded in both law and
fact. The contention with Holladay and Emmett, whether conducted
in the name of Elliott or Hickox, turned, so far as the former was