mmimonm a 0. B. oo. v. ADAMS mxrsmss oo. 33
manner they have heretofore received them, and to compel them
to prepay the charges. It is very well known that like questions
have heretofore been presented to this court, in regard to which I
have been a dissenting judge. In the conduct of business by these
corporations, or quasi corporations, which to a greater or less extent
fasten themselves upon the common business of the country through
railroads and otherwise, very conflicting questions arise, because a
railroad is bound, as a common carrier, to perform all the duties im-
posed upon it as such. It chooses to sublet, if you please, or fastcn
upon itself contracts with regard to these outside corporations, and .
by so doing, puts itself in a condition that subjects the public at
large to obligations or difficulties which, if the railroads themselves
performed what they are required by law to perform, the shippers
would be relieved of those difficulties. For illustration, a railroad
exists; it is bound by law as a common carrier to perform its duties `
through one or the other contrivance. It fastens upon itself a fast-
freight contract, or an express contract. Where are its obligations ?
Is it to relieve itself of those, and remit the party to these outside j
corporations? Constant complications are arising with regard to
such organizations. My brother judges would say that the courts
might, to a large extent, regulate the mode of transacting business,
each with the other, and one company enforce on the other and en-
force upon the railroads a duty, as Mr. Pollard says, of doing busi-
ness each for the other without discrimination.
Now, as far as I am concerned judicially, I have no faith in any
such doctrine, but authorities superior to myself have, and in the
light of the authority that is thus presented I must pass upon the
question before me. Accepting, then, the proposition in the light of
such authorities, all who act as common carriers must perform their
functions without discrimination. Does that discrimination go so far
as to say that they must pay antecedent charges, and trust the oppor-
tunity at the other end of the route of ever receiving anything ? Must
it advance to the shipping company all prior expenses incurred, and
run the chances of ever collecting anything? What is the policy ? At
this end of the line, so to speak, shall they pay all these antecedent
charges from Portland, Maine, for instance,.under a C. O. D., and, not
knowing the contents of the package, allow it to go forward? Is that
the proposition of law? If the company at this end of the line, for
illustration, has paid the advance charges, who is responsible there- _
for? The shipper andthe company transporting? The charges ad-
vanced for the beneht of the company from whom it receives, as well
as for the shipper of the article itself? Suppose it does not choose
to trust the shipper or the company. Suppose both are insolvent-- .
utterly insolvent. Is it bound to pay, day in and day out, the money
required in such matters, with no possibility of receiving a sixpence
remuneration for the transaction?
Now, I do not know, in the case here submitted, whether this dis-
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