HANNEB v. MOUL'1'ON• 7
Ware v. Cowles, 24 Ala. 446; Forsythe v. Kimball, 91 U. S. 291;
Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643.
The rule on the subject under consideration has been thus stated:
“Parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary
the terms of a valid written instrument." Adams v. Wordley, 1 Mees.
& W. 379, 380; Boorman v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. 573; Lazare’s E:c’rs v.
Peytrwin, 4 Mart. (La.) 684; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 275. As applied to
wills, the rule is thus stated in 2 Powell, Dev. (Jarman’s Ed.) 5-11:
"Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter, detract from, or add to
the terms of a will, though it may be used to rebut a resulting trust
attaching to a legal title created by it."
The writing, if it be a contract, may be read inthe light of the sur-
rounding circumstances in order more perfectly to understand the
meaning of the parties. If it be a will, the circumstances under which
the testator executed it, or the state of his property, his family, and
» the like may be shown in order to throw light upon his intention, as
expressed by the words used in the will. 1 Greenl. Ev. 277; 2 Pow-
ell, Dev. pp. 5—11, rule 8; Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643. But in both
cases, as the writing is the only outward and visible expression of the
meaning of the party or parties to it, no other words are to be added
to it, or substituted for those used. "The duty of the court in such
cases is to ascertain, not what the parties may have secretly intended
as contradistinguished from what their words expressed, but what is
the meaning of the words they have used." Greenl. Ev. § 277; Doe
v. Gwillirn, 5 Barn. & Adol. 122, 129; Doe v. Martin, 4 Barn. Sv Adol.
771-786; Beaumont v. Field, 2 Chit. 275. ·
In Hunt v. White, ubi supra, the rule was expressed, in substance,
as follows: "The intent of the testator must be ascertained from the
meaning of the words used in the will, and those words alone; but
extrinsic evidence is admissible of such facts and circumstances as
will enable the court to discover the meaning attached by the testa-
tor to the words used in the will, and to apply them to the particular
facts of the case.
A distinguished writer lays down the rule of law upon this subject,
as applicable to wills, as follows:
" As the law requires wills, both of real and personal estate to bein writing,
it cannot consistently with this doctrine permit parol evidence to be adduced
to contradict, add to, or explain the contents of such will; and the principle of
this rule evidently demands an inilexible adherence to it, even when the con- V
sequence is the partial or total failure of the testator’s intended disposition;
for it would have been of little avail to require that a will ab origins should be
in writing, or to fence a testator round with a guard of attesting witnesses, if,
when the written instrument failed to make a full and explicit disclosure of
his scheme of disposition, its deficiencies might be supplied, or its inaccura·
cies corrected from extrinsic sources." 1 Jarm. Wills, 409.
This exposition of the law is sustained by a large array of author·
ities cited in the notes. This rule was applied by the supreme court
of the United States in the case of Mackie v. Story, 93 U. S. 589. The