8 FEDERAL imroivrmt.
question in that case was whether the whole legacy bequeathed by a
will to two brothers accrued to Benjamin Story, the survivor, or
- whether one-half of it did so, leaving the deceased intestate as to the
other half. On the trial the children of Henry C. Story offered parol
evidence to show the good will and affection of the deceased towards
him for the purpose of demonstrating the intention of the testator in
the bequest. The court ruled that the evidence was properly rejected;
Mr. Justice BRADLEY, who delivered the judgment of the court, re-
marking: “The paper must speak for itself, and its meaning and ef-
fect be ascertained by the court."
The rule is further illustrated and sustained by the following au-
thorities: In Brown v. Selwin, Cas. t. Talb. 240, the testator be-
queathed the residue of his personal estate to two persons, whom he
appointed his executors, and one of whom was indebted to him by
bond. It was attempted to be proved by the evidence of the person
who drew the will that he received the testator’s written instructions
to release the bond debt by the will, but that he refused to do so under
I the impression that the appointment of the obligor to be one of the
executors extinguished the debt. Lord Tanner held the evidence to
be inadmissible, and his decree was affirmed on appeal by the house
of lords. In Strode v. Lady Falkland, 3 Ch. Cas. 90, letters and oral
declarations of the testator being offered to prove the intention to in-
clude a revision in the words "all other, my lands, tenements, and
hereditaments out of settlement," it was unanimously agreed that this
kind of evidence could not be admitted, for that, where a will was
doubtful and uncertain,-it must receive its construction from the words
of the will itself, and no parol proof or declaration ought to be admit-
ted out of the will to ascertain it. So, in Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns.
1, it was held that where a testator bequeathed to his wife "all the
rest, residue, and remainder of the moneys belonging to his estate at
the time of his decease," the word "n1oneys" did not comprehend
bonds, mortgages, or other choses in action, and that the declarations
of the testator to show a different intent were inadmissible. In the
case of Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201, G. devised as follows: "I give
and bequeath to my beloved wife, for and during her widowhood, the
farm which I now occupy, with the whole of the crops of every de-
scription which may be thereon at tl1e time of my death, " etc., and
after the remarriage or death of his wife, he devised the same to S.
and his heirs. It was held that extrinsic or parol evidence to show
that the testator intended to devise the whole of his real estate at W.,
which included a farm of 90 acres in the tenure of B., under a lease
from the testator for seven years, and that he gave such instructions
to the attorney who drew the will, was inadmissible, there being no
latent ambiguity in the will, but only a mistake. See, also, Wig.
Wills, props. 5, 6, 7; Tucker v. Seamarfs Aid Soc. 7 Metc. 188; Lord
Walpole v. Earl of C/tolmondcley, 7 Term. B. 138; Herrick v. Stover,
5 Wend. 580; Wrllliams v. Crary, 4 Wend. 443; Ryerss v. Wheeler,