20 rmnsmn nmroarsn.
Boones and others v. Panscorr and others.
(Uircuit Court, W. D. Tennessee. February 21, 1885.)
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—STATUTE wrrrr Dnrmorivm Trr1.m—TmNN1a:ss1m Aer or
1873, Cu. 118; Cousrrrrurron or 1870, ART. 2, § 17-TAx Sums.
A tax sale under the Tennessee act of 1873, e. 118, for the assessment and col-
lection of taxes, is void, because the act contains legislation not expressed in
its title, relating to state and county taxation, in which the subject of munic-
ipal taxation is not properly included. p
2. SAME SusJscr—TsNNnssas Cons, § 612 mr smc.
A proceeding to sell land for taxes, under the unconstitutional act of 1873,
cannot be sustained as a proceeding under the Code, (sections 612 et seq.,) be-
cause the two methods of procedure for the sale of lands for taxes are radically
different.
In Ejectment.
W. M . Randolph, for plaintiffs.
W. S. Flippin, for defendants.
. Hsnmoun, J. The defendants claim to have purchased the plain-
tiif’s land at a tax sale, made under the act of the general assembly of
, the state of Tennessee of March 25, 1873·, c. 118, entitled "An act to
provide more just and equitable laws for the assessment and collection
4 of revenue for state and county purposes, and to repeal all laws now
in force whereby revenue is collected from the assessment of real es-
tate, personal property, privileges, and polls." On the authority of
the case of Knoxville v. Lewis, 12 Lea, 180, the foregoing act must
be pronounced unconstitutional, because it violates article 2,`§ 17, of
the constitution of the state, which provides as follows: "No bill
shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that sub· ·
ject to be expressed in its title. All acts which repeal, revive, or
amend former laws shall recite in their caption, or otherwise, the
title or substance of the law repealed, revived, or amended." Const.
1870, art. 2, § 17. That case declared unconstitutional an act of the
general assembly of April 7, 1881, (chapter 171,) with precisely the
_ same title as the act of 1873, because its section 50é related to mu-
nicipal revenues, while no reference was made to that subject in the
title. The same intirmity exists in this act of 1873, which, in section
81, legislates on the subject of municipal revenues under the very
same title as the other. No two cases could be more alike, for any
difference between the two acts in the character of the legislation on
the subject of municipal revenue is wholly immaterial. The infirmity
does not depend on the distinctive features of the eccentric legisla-
tion, but its subject matter. Any legislation concerning municipal
revenues, under the title above quoted, must be, according to that
decision of the supreme court of the state,——which is binding on us,
whatever we may think of it,-sufficient to avoid the whole act as ob-
noxious to the constitution. State v. McCann, 4 Lea, 1; Murphy v.
State, 9 Lea, 373, 379.