m uu MILLER. 33
informations were made in January, 1882, in said county of Clarion,
against the petitioner, charging him with robbery and assault with
intent to commit murder, and under extradition proceedings had on
these charges he was surrendered on March 11, 1882. He was then
taken back to the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, where he
has since been held. Bills of indictment against him on the said
charges of robbery and felonious assault were ignored by the grand
jury of Clarion county on J anuarj 17, 1883. The petition alleges
that said informations were gotten up by the penitentiary authorities
as a mere pretext to secure the petitioner’s surrender, to the end that
they might seize and imprison him on his conviction for burglary.
The return of the warden of the penitentiary sets up, as his authority
for holding the petitioner, his commitment to the penitentiary by the
court of oyer and terminer of Clarion county under his conviction and
sentence for burglary.
The application for the petitioner’s discharge proceeds upon the
theory that the treaty between the United States and Great" Britain
secures to the extradited person immunity from detention for any
crime other than that upon which the surrender is made; or, at least,
exemption from detention for any offense not within the treaty. Now,
it is indeed true that it has been held by Judge Horrmsiv, in U. S. v.
Watts, 14 Fan. REP. 130, and by the supreme court of Kentucky, in
Com. v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697, that an extradited person under this ,
treaty cannot be tried for any offenses other than extradition crimes;
and in State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273, the supreme court of
Ohio carried the doctrine of exemption still further, holding that the
extradited person could be put on trial only for the particular offense
for which he had been surrendered. Upon these adjudications, which,
on account of the eminence of the judges and courts pronouncing
them, are certainly entitled to great respect, the petitioner’s counsel
confidently rely as establishing a principle applicable to and decisive
of this case. But then, on the other hand, in U. S. v. Caldwell, 8
Blatchf. 131, and U. S. v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 295, it was held by
Judge Bnunuror (who gives most cogent reasons for the conclusion)
that extradition proceedings do not by their nature secure to the per.
son surrendered for one crime immunity from prosecution for other
offenses, whether within the treaty or not; and he distinctly ruled that
no such immunity is conferred by the treaty now under consideration.
A like determination was reached by the court of appeals of New York
in Adriance v. Lagmvc, 59 N. Y. 110, where an extradited person, sur-
rendered by the government of France under treaty stipulations, was
arrested on civil process.
The question whether the treaty of 1842 between the United States
and Great Britain prohibits the trial of the extradited person for an
offense not specihed in the proceedings or named in the treaty, must,
therefore, be regarded as still open, while the precise question now
before me, it would seem, is altogether new. If the treaty affords
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