56 IEDERAI4 REPORTER.
HAMMOND held that the docket fee was taxable where, after a cause
was set on the hearing docket, it was dismissed by an order of the
court, either generally or without prejudice, on motion of the plain-
tiff; and also where, after a decree against the defendant for an in-
junction and an account, and for costs, the cause was dismissed by
the court on motion of the plaintiff. There were answers in all the
cases, and replications in two, but no replications in the others.
In Andrews v. Cote, 20 Fan. Rnr. 410, in 1884, in this court, in a
suit in equity, there was an order pro covgcsso, followed by a nnal de-
cree. It was held by Judge   that there had been a final
hearing, and that a docket fee was taxable, because a final decree
A after an order pro confesso was not a matter of course.
The conclusion from the considerations above stated, supported as
they appear to be by all the cases cited, except, perhaps, thatof
Goodyear v. Sawyer, is that to constitute "a final hearing in equity
or admiralty," within the meaning of section 824, there must be a
hearing of the cause on its merits; that is, a submission of it to the
court. in such shape as the parties choose to give it, with a view to a
· determination whether the plaintiff or libelant has made out the case
stated by. him in his bill or libel as the ground for the permanent
relief which his pleading seeks, on such proofs as the parties place
before the court, be the case one of pro oordesso, or bill or libel and
answer, or pleadings alone, or pleadings and proofs. Nor does it
detract from the force of this conclusion, that what is called an in-
terlocutory decree, as distinguished from a final decree, is often en-
tered as the result of a decision on a nnal hearing. In 2 Daniell,
Gh.'Pr. c. 26, § 1, (4th Amer. Ed.) 986, it is said:
"A decree is a sentence or order of the court, pronounced on hearing and
understanding all the points in issue, and determining the right of all the
parties to the suit, according to equity and good conscience. It is either in-
terlocutory or iinal. An interlocutory decree is when the consideration of
the particular question to be determined, or the further consideration of the
cause generally, is reserved till a future hearing."
The docket fee is given by section 824 as a fee to the solicitor or
proctor "on" the final hearing. If there is such a final hearing as is
above defined, the fee is taxable, as between party and party, in behalf
of the party to whom the costs of the cause are awarded. Nor is
there anything in the statute which forbids the allowance of a docket
fee on or for each trial before a jury where there is a verdict, or on
or for each Hnal hearing in equity or admiralty, if there are two or
more final hearings, such as are above defined, in the same cause. A
new trial granted after verdict is as complete a trial, if there is a
verdict in it, as was the Hrst trial; and a rehearing or second hear-
ing, such as was had in suits Nos. 1, 9, and 10, after a decision was
rendered in them, is as complete a final hearing as was the first one.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the second $20 docket fee, in each
of the three cases so reheard, must be allowed.