SUN MUT. INS. co. v. scum 01*-LIQUIDATION. 5
..... t
bonds" and of "coupon certihcates," under the act of 1882, and as
such holders they seek to enjoin the respondents from issuing the
bonds provided for under the act of 1884 to judgment creditors, upon
the ground that the means provided for the payment of the latter are
more or less identical with those set apart for the payment of the for-
mer. After a consideration of the arguments which were urged with
such ability upon this question, it seems to me to be unnecessary to
pass upon it. Without passing upon this question, even if the con-
struction of the two acts be such as is contended_ for by complainants,
there is, nevertheless, an impediment in the way of enforcing the grant
of the act of 1882, so far as relates to the judgment creditors included
in the provisions of the act of 1884. Both acts relate to the surplus
arising under or out of the taxes levied in pursuance of the act cre-
ating the premium bond system and other property. Since this sur-
plus is an annual result for a great number of years, wrought out
_ by the fact that onlya portion of the bonded creditors became partic-
ipants in the scheme, it is in its nature and capacity to be disposed
of either by the legislature or by the debtor, subject to the same legal »
limitations and rules as any other property. Until the legislature
had given to a creditor a grant or legislative permission to share in
this property, it might have been impossible for him to present the
question of his right to a share in this residue of a tax; but by the act
of 1884 judgment creditors have been placed in such a situation that
they can lawfully present the question of their right to a participation
in this residue to the extent which this act recognizes their right.
lt is to be observed that the act of 1884, under which the judg-
ment creditors claim, includes only such judgments as had been or
should be obtained against the city of New Orleans for debts which
had an existence prior to the year 1879. It relates, therefore, only
to debts owed antecedently to its passage, and has no reference to
debts thereafter arising. The debts represented by the extended bonds
and the coupon certincates which form the basis of the claim of the
complainants were also pre-existing, having been owed by the city
for many years. The debts on both sides of this controversy, there-
fore, were debts in existence antecedently to the passage of the act of
1882.
The article No. 3,150 (old) of the Civil Code had been in force as a
part of the law of the state since the year 1825. That article is as
follows; " The property of the debtor is the common pledge of his
creditors." So far as the legislature allows municipal corporations
to become debtors they are, equally with individuals, within the do-
minion of this law. Since the power of taxation is vested in the leg-
islature so far as concerns the fresh levy of taxes, this rule, however
binding in equity and upon the conscience of the legislators, could
not be enforced. So far, also, as future debts are concerned, the leg-
islature could to any extent exclude their holders from participation
in the property of a debtor. But so far as pre-existing debts are con-