BUN Mor. INS. co. v. BOARD or LIQUIDA'I’ION• 7
declared such a preference prohibited. For the doctrine of the stat-
ute compelling equal distribution or provision among or for co·exist—
ing creditors, i. e., to prevent any partial appropriation by the debtor,
see,Succc.s·slon of Taylor, 10 La. Ann. 510, and an affirmation of
the `law of that case in Milne v. Schmidt, 12 La- Ann. 553. This
statutory rule operates upon the legislature as well as upon the debtor.
It is no more in the power of law-makers than of debtors to effect an
unequal distribution of the debtor’s estate by making an application
or transfer thereof among creditors already existing. This also has
been judicially declared. In Atclzajalaytt R. at Banking Co. V. Bean,
3 Rob. 415, the court says:
"I think it clear that the legislature cannot constitutionally, by act subse-
quent to the creation of a debt, interfere to change or disturb the relation
between debtor and creditor, or the relative rank of creditors inter se, and that
two creditors who stood equal originally in the eyes of the law, and had an
equal privilege to be paid, neither having any special lien or privilege over
the other, must remain forever equal, notwithstanding any act of the legislap
ture sanctioning a different doctrine."
Unless, then, the old bondholders have some privilege upon the ex-
cess, it could not be in tote given by the act of 1882 to the exclusion
of already existing judgment creditors. But the old bondholders had
no privilege upon this excess. By the acts under which the different
series of bonds were authorized, a right to a tax was given, which re-
mains in all its original force, except as waived by the holder’s own
volition. But this is altogether distinct from any premium bond ex-
cess, and if it was to be considered at all, would be an obstacle rather
than aid to the complainants; for it would present the case of a
complainant with a perfect security asking to have a preference in
his favor maintained as against another creditor who had no security
whatever. Until the old bondholders assented to the premium bond
plan, by an exchange of his bond, he could claim nothing under it.
Till such acceptance the premium bond act stood as an unaccepted
and therefore inoperative oder. The provision that the drawn pre-
mium bonds should be applied to the purchase of the old bonds, until
in some way assented to by the holders, was, so far as relates to such
holders, a mere legislative provision, having no quality of a contract.
In fact, the acifof 1880 had altogether recalled this provision.
It was urged, crguendo, that section 10 of the act of 1882 guar·
antied the continuous application ofthe drawn premium bonds to I
the purchase of the old bonds, according to sections 11 or 5 of the
premium bond act. But the carefully selected words of that section
of the act of 1882 exclude such an interpretation, and merely declare
the whole act a contract, which may be enforced by "every judicial
process then in force, or in force at the time ol the creation of the
debt;" i. e., the rights to be enforced were those created by the act
of 1882. The process for their enforcement should be that in force
in 1882, as well as that in force at the time of the issuing of the