16 FEDERAL REPORTER.
, ever since been and is now a resident of Bavaria; that "said Joseph
Koetzl in his life-time, t0—wit, from the time of l1er birth up to the
year 1850, in the kingdom of Bavaria, recognized her, said J ustina
Kahl, as his child, and· that such recognition was general and noto-
rious; that on the fourteenth day of May, 1834, in certain proceed-
ings had before the royal Bavarian county court, it was determined
and adjudged that said Justina Kahl was the illegitimate daughter of
said Joseph Koetzl; and the intervenor claims that such recognition
and adjudication enable her to inherit her father’s property under
the provisions of section 2466 of the Code of Iowa, which enacts that
illegitimate children "shal1 inherit from the father, whenever the
paternity is proven during the life of the father, or they have been
recognized by him as his children; but such recognition must have
been general and notorious, or else in writing."
T0 this petition the plaintiffs interpose a demurrer on the ground
that the alleged adjudication by the court in Bavaria was- had, and
the acts of recognition took place, before the Code of 1851 took effect;
and that previous to that time, under the laws of Iowa, an illegiti-
mate child could not inherit the estate of the father, even though the
paternity had been fully established or recognized.
Previous to the adoption of the Code of 1851, the provisions of the
statute in force did not change the rule of the common law that an
_ illegitimate child could not inherit the estate of the father. The
Code of 1851 enacted that illegitimate children should “inherit from
the father, whenever they have been recognized by him as his chil·
dren; but such recognition must have been general and notorious, or
else in writing." By the Code of 1873 it is provided that such chil-
dren may also inherit “from the father whenever the paternity has
been proven during the life of the father."
The question presented for determination is whether the adjudica-
tion of paternity and recognition of the relationship had and per-
formed before the enactment of the Codes of 1851 and 1873, should
be held suihcient, under these statutes, to confer the right of inherit-
ance, or whether the intervenor must show a recognition since the
adoption of the Code of 1851, or an adjudication since the passage of
tl1e Code of 1873. This question was before the supreme court of Iowa
in the case of Crane v. Crane, 31 Iowa, 296, but was not ruled upon;
and my attentron has not been called to any other case in which the
question has been determined by the supreme court of Iowa.
On part of the intervenor it is claimed that the rule of inheritance
is always subject to legislative control, and may be changed at any
time, and that such change will affect the status in all cases save
those wherein vested rights have accrued; It cannot be questioned
that the mere expectation of inheriting property is not deemed to be
a vested right, and the rules of descent may be lawfully changed, and
V such change may affect all estates not already passed to the heir by
the death of the owner. Under this doctrine it is clear that it was