mariners v. FERRING. 17
within the power of the legislature, when adopting the Codes of 1851
and 187 3, to modify or change the rules of descent previously in force,
and such changes would be applicable to all estates vesting after the
taking effect of these Codes. Thus, if the legislature had, in 1851,
enacted that illegitimate children, if their paternity was thereafter
acknowledged in writing, should inherit equally with legitimate issue,
it could not be questioned that the rule thus established would con-
trol in all cases to which it was applicable, and in which the estate
had not vested before the taking effect of the legislative enactment.
The question to be determined in this cause, however, is not so
much the right or authority of the legislature to change the rules of
descent, as it is the true meaning of the enactment; that i_.· to say, I
whether it was the intent of the legislature to provide that a past
recognition of paternity should have the effect of conferring rights
of inheritance, or must such recognition have been made after the
passage ofthe act? It is clear from the very language of the statute
that it was not intended to confer the right of inheritance upon all
illegitimate children. The Code of 1851 makes the 1·ight of inherit-
ance in case of illegitimacy depend upon the performance of certain
acts by the father. After the adoption of the Code of 1851, the acts
of recognition contemplated in the statute had attached thereto cer-
tain legal consequences, and the presumption legally arises that the
father recognizing his illegitimate children in the modes pointed out by
the statute intends, by such recognition, to confer upon them the right
of inheritance. If, however, it be held that the statute is intended
to give force to acts of recognition performed before the adoption of
the Code, then we give an effect to an act which it did not legally
have when performed. The statute would thus be given a retroactive
effect, and an act which, when done, had no legal significance, and
was not intended nor understood by the parties to it to affect any
right of inheritance, would be held to confer such a right. Whatever
may be said of the power of the legislature to thus attach to an act
done a legal significance which it did not possess when done, it is
clear that it will not be presumed that it was the intent of the legis-
lature to make the statute retroactive in this particular, unless such
intent is clearly established by the language of the statute. The or-
dinary presumption is that statutes are intended to be prospective
alone in their operation.
There is nothing found in the section of the Code in question, nor
in the context, which indicates any purpose to make the statute re-
troactive. The better rule would seem to be, `therefore, to hold that,
to enable an illegitimate child to inherit under this section of the
Code, it must appear that the recognition or proof of paternity relied
upon, occurred after the passage of the act by the legislature; it being,
in the language of the supreme court in Stcvensovfs Heirs v. Sullivant,
5 Wheat. 260, "most reasonable so to construe the law as to enable
the father to perceive all the consequences of his recognition at the
v.24r,no.1——2